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Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary 
By Charles H. Koch, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
Administrative agencies adjudicate massive numbers of 
individual disputes, far exceeding the number resolved by courts. 
Generally, administrative adjudications determine the individual 
rights and duties created through an administrative program. 1 Similar 
to the judicial process, the adjudicative function of the administrative 
process involves a substantial amount of agency policy. However, 
despite its importance, the development of policy within the agency 
adjudicative machinery is little understood, even by the 
administrative adjudicative personnel engaged in it. Therefore, a 
close look at the policymaking function and the responsibility of 
administrative adjudicators, especially those at the hearing level, is 
needed.2 
* Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of 
Law. B.A., University of Maryland, 1966; J.D., George Washington University, 
1969; LL.M, University of Chicago, 1975. I would like to thank Michael Asimow, 
John Hardwicke, William Moran, Jim Rossi, and Sidney Shapiro for their valuable 
comments. 
1. AITORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
ACT 14 (1947) ("[A]djudication is concerned with the determination of past and 
present rights and liabilities."); see Paul Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication 
Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 739, 739 n.1 ( 1976). 
2. "The term 'policy' encompasses a wide variety of decisions that advance or 
protect some collective goal of the community as a whole (as opposed to those 
decisions that respect or secure some individual or group right)." I CHARLES H. 
KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 6 (2d ed. 1997) (citing Ronald 
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1059 (1975), reprinted in RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82 (1977)); see HENRY HART & ALBERT 
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION 
OF LAW 141 (William Eskridge & Philip Frickey eds., 4th ed. 1994) (stating that 
"[a] policy is simply a statement of objective."). Setting policy is the most 
important function assigned to agencies. James Landis declared: "The ultimate test 
of the administrative [institution] is the policy that it formulates; not the fairness as 
50 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-1 
To some extent, administrative policymaking is similar to judicial 
lawmaking in the general common-law system? Thus, this Article 
looks to studies of that lawmaking process, and draws on insightful 
theoretical works to aid in conceptualizing the issues.4 Empirical 
studies on the influences and motivations behind judicial 
decisionmaking begin the inquiry into administrative policymaking.5 
However, the substantial differences between judicial lawmaking and 
administrative policymaking require this Article's analysis to 
ultimately reach beyond the implications of these studies. 
Administrative agencies usually have considerable policymaking 
responsibility and hence administrative adjudicators operate in 
policy-rich environments. The agency's substantial policymaking role 
serves to complicate the adjudicator's policy function more so than 
the conventional judiciary. While administrative adjudicative 
processes follow a hierarchy similar to the judicial process, the 
adjudicators throughout administrative adjudications-from the 
between the parties of the disposition of a controversy on a record of their own 
making." lAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATNE PROCESS 39 (1938). 
3.See HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 164 ("The body of decisional law 
announced by the courts in the disposition of these [individual] problems tends 
always to be the initial and continues to be the underlying body of law governing 
the society."). 
4. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking 
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1994); Evan H. 
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. 
L. REv. 817, 852-54 (1994); Evan H. Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a 
"Unified Judiciary," 78 TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2000); DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at chap. 4; HART & SACKS, supra note 2; 
Federick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571 ( 1987) [hereinafter Schauer, 
Precedent]; Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious 
Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000) [hereinafter 
Schauer, Incentives]. 
5. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. 
Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717 (1997) [hereinafter Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation]; Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A 
Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 VA. L. REv. 805 (1999) (hereinafter 
Revesz, Ideology]; Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the Federal 
Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided 
Courts, 29 1. LEGAL STUD. 685 (2000) [hereinafter Revesz, Litigation and 
Settlement]; Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and 
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
107 YALE. L.J. 2155,2174 (1998). 
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hearing level to administrative review-have more policy-related 
responsibilities than their counterparts in the conventional judiciary. 
However, the role of the courts in administrative adjudications further 
complicates the policymak:ing aspect of administrative adjudications. 
Although a court's role is closely confined by the judicial review 
doctrine, it necessarily injects the courts and conventional judges into 
this perpetually active policymak:ing environment. Thus the 
administrative judiciary, in this case incorporating courts, works in a 
complex and dynamic policymaking context. 
Take for example the mundane case of the Sunbeam grill.6 
Safeway Bread held a memorial day outing for its employees. 
Safeway purchased a Sunbeam gas grill for the hamburgers and 
hotdogs. The specifications for the grill called for a twenty-pound gas 
tank. Safeway's head of maintenance decided that a twenty-pound 
tank was inadequate and adapted the grill to use a forty-pound tank. 
Unfortunately, an Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) compliance officer attended the cookout. He concluded the 
grill as adapted violated the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 (OSH Act) and issued a citation. Safeway requested a hearing 
with the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 
(OSHRC), a separate agency designed to adjudicate such violations. 
Safeway argued that its conduct should be governed by OSHA's 
Compressed Gases Standards.7 These standards state that "[t]he in-
plant handling, storage, and utilization of all compressed gases . . . 
shall be in accordance with Compressed Gas Association Pamphlet 
P-1-1965."8 The pamphlet did not proscribe adapting gas grills to 
accommodate larger gas tanks. However, OSHA argued that the use 
of the Sunbeam grill did not fall within the OSHA standard's 
definition. Thus, OSHA urged that Safeway had violated OSH Act § 
5(a)(l): "Each employer ... shall furnish to each of his employees 
employment and a place of employment which are free from 
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or 
6. Sec'y of Labor v. Safeway, Inc., OSHRC Docket No. 99-0316, 2000 
Occupational Safety and Health Decisions (CCH) '![ 32,157 (July 12, 2000) 
[hereinafter Safeway]. 
7.29 C.P.R.§ 1910.102 (2004). 
8./d. 
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serious physical harm to his employees . . . . "9 After a hearing, the 
administrative judge concluded that Safeway violated the Act. 10 In 
the course of deciding this trivial dispute, the administrative judge 
made significant policy-related choices. These choices arguably add 
to the agency law regarding both the legislation and the agency's 
policy pronouncement. If reviewed, the review authority would have 
to develop or at least confirm these choices and thereby further add to 
the body of agency law. Thus, the Safeway example confirms that any 
administrative adjudicative, no matter how trivial, may confront and 
even contribute to the evolution of administrative policy. 
In any administrative case, the numerous agency policymaking 
processes present the administrative judiciary with a complex array of 
policy pronouncements. Collectively called "rulemaking," most 
agencies have processes designed to carry out these responsibilities 
(including any formal policy statements). Rulemaking is a quasi-
legislative process, and its goal is to make general pronouncements 
with future effect. 11 Agency policy is often developed through 
rulemaking. Rules, policy statements, and similar pronouncements-
like legislation-often impact the public through individual 
adjudications. However, like legislation, these devices are limited in 
the number of individual disputes they can resolve. The 
administrative judiciary must apply legislative and regulatory policy, 
and in the process of doing so resolve interstitial policy issues raised 
by both. Even though most agencies possess general policymaking 
processes, administrative adjudications remain a critical part of 
administrative policymaking. At this level, legislation is somewhat 
9.29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2000). The OSHA Field Operations Manual set out a 
four-part test for finding a violation of this "general duty clause." OSHA FIELD 
OPERATIONS MANUAL pt. IV -4 (6th ed. 1994). 
10. Safeway, supra note 6. 
ll. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act § 551(4) provides: '"[R]ule' 
means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular 
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or 
policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an 
agency .... " 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000) [hereinafter APA]. The 1961 Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act, after which most state AP As are modeled provides: 
"'[R]ule' means each agency statement of general applicability that implements, 
interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or 
practice requirements of any agency." MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
ACT, 1961 Act§ 1(7), 15 U.L.A. 185 (2000) [hereinafter 61 MSAPA]. 
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removed and the agency policy pronouncements provide another tier 
of general pronouncement. Administrative adjudicators must honor 
legislative policy and administrative policy resolutions, and at the 
same time exercise the expansive policymaking roles they hold. This 
Article explores and argues for the enhancement of the policy 
contribution of administrative adjudicators. 
I. PLACE OF ADJUDICATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY 
Well-established administrative law doctrine holds that agencies 
have considerable authority in deciding how to proceed. 12 For 
generations, this doctrine has dictated that agencies may develop 
policy in adjudication as well as rulemaking. The doctrine and its 
impact on policymaking in administrative adjudications is best 
explained by a few of the classic cases associated with its 
development. 
Faced with the question presented in its most basic form, the 
Supreme Court, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery13 
("Chenery If'), definitively established the authority to make agency 
law in adjudication. 14 The SEC refused to approve the reorganization 
of a utility company seeking reorganization under the recently 
enacted Public Utility Holding Company Act because company 
insiders received special advantages from their purchases. Neither the 
Act nor any SEC rule proscribed the conduct. Although there was no 
fraud involved, the SEC took the opportunity to establish for the first 
time a policy against insider trading. 
In a prior case, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery 
15 ("Chenery f'), the Court stated that "before transactions otherwise 
legal can be outlawed or denied their usual business consequences, 
they must fall under the ban of some standards of conduct proscribed 
by an agency of government authorized to prescribe such 
12. For further discussion see 1 KOCH, supra note 2, § 2.12, for an 
explanation of an agency's choice between rulemaking and adjudication. 
13. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) [hereinafter Chenery II]. 
14. See id. at 203. 
15. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1942) [hereinafter Chenery /]. 
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standards." 16 Chenery II dispelled the notion that this language 
required an agency (where the standard is unclear) to make a general 
rule before proceeding through case-by-case enforcement adjucations. 
In Chenery II, the Court stated: "The absence of a general rule or 
regulation governing management trading during reorganization did 
not affect the Commission's duties in relation to the particular 
proposal before it." 17 Thus, the Court held that the SEC may develop 
administrative policy while adjudicating an individual dispute in 
addition to developing such policy through generalized rulemaking. 18 
Justice Jackson, dissenting in Chenery II, would have required the 
SEC to give notice of the agency law before applying the law 19-in 
short, Jackson would have required the agency to first make a 
generally applicable "rule." Tersely commenting on the issue, 
Jackson suggested some problem with an agency making agency law 
through cases under any circumstances: "Even if the Commission 
had, as the Court says, utilized this case to announce a new legal 
standard of conduct, there would be hurdles to be cleared .... "20 
Implicit from the remainder of the opinion, Jackson thought it 
16. /d. at 92-93. 
17. Chenery II, supra note 13, at 20 l. 
18. This making of agency law or administrative policymaking must be 
sharply distinguished from statutory interpretation. The distinction is crucial to the 
authority of federal courts and hence it has been well expressed in that context. 
Field, for example, observed that '"federal common law' ... refer[s) to any rule of 
federal law created by a court ... when the substance of that rule is not clearly 
suggested by federal enactments-constitutional or congressional." Martha A. 
Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REv. 881, 
890 (1986) (emphasis omitted). Merrill expressed the necessary contrast between 
lawmaking and interpretation: '"Federal common law' ... means any federal rule 
of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text-
whether or not that rule can be described as the product of 'interpretation' in either 
a conventional or an unconventional sense." Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law 
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985). Since agencies have 
substantial policymaking authority, the distinction is crucial to allocating authority 
between agencies and courts. While courts dominate statutory interpretation, they 
must give considerable difference to agency policy decisions. Charles H. Koch, Jr., 
Judicial Review of Administrative Policymaking, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 375, 
376 (2003). This basic doctrine makes an understanding of the workings of 
administrative policymaking all the more important. 
19. Chenery II, supra note 13, at 217. 
20. /d. at 215. Jackson did not elaborate because that was "something the 
Commission expressly declined to do." !d. 
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inherently unfair to order forfeiture of property based on law created 
in the same case prohibiting the conduct. Indeed, such post hoc 
condemnation seems questionable in the abstract, but the common-
law process itself contemplates such case-by-case lawmaking?' In 
light of this tradition, and perhaps more practically because the 
administrative process needs the policy development alternative even 
more so than the judicial process, federal courts have refused to 
second guess procedural choices of agencies?2 In other words, 
federal law does not "require rulemak:ing."23 
Since Chenery II, the Court has continually affirmed the general 
principle that agencies have broad discretion to develop agency law 
through adjudication. The most important affirmation of this 
principle is found in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co. 24 The NLRB 
21. However, even in the common-law system, courts are constrained. Federal 
courts, for example, rarely have the authority to make law but are confined to some 
variety of interpretation. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.1 (4th 
ed. 2003); see John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 113, 121 (1998) (explaining the development of judge-made law and 
its relevance to the administrative system). 
22. E.g., United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 580 (6th Cir. 
2003) ("Agencies have discretion to choose between rulemaking and 
adjudication."); Davis v. EPA, 348 F.3d 772, 785 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Absent express 
congressional direction to the contrary, agencies are free to choose their procedural 
mode of administration."). 
23. While required rulemaking has not been adopted in the federal system, it is 
often required either by legislation or judicial decision in state administrative law. 1 
KOCH, supra note 2, § 2.12. Statutes in some states require prior notice of the law, 
sometimes called "required rulemaking." E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.54(1) 
(Harrison 1999); Megdal v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 605 P.2d 273, 
274 (Or. 1980); Cleveland Freight Lines, Inc. v. Ohio PUC, 402 N.E.2d 1192, 1195 
(Ohio 1980) ("[W]hen there is not a definite commission rule, order, or decision 
forbidding a particular practice, the imposition of a substantial penalty is 
unreasonable."); accord, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. v. Utah PSC, 737 P.2d 983, 
986 (Utah 1987). Bonfield, one of the drafters of the 1981 model state act, has long 
advocated some requirement of rulemaking. ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING§ 4.4.1 (1986); see also Jim Rossi, Overcoming 
Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. 
L. REv. 551, 572 (200 I) ("One of the reasons for the proliferation of this doctrine 
in states . . . may be that it allows better oversight of the rulemaking process, 
es_tJecially given the weak oversight capacity of state legislatures when agencies 
operate outside of their rulemaking processes."). 
24. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). 
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ordered Wyman-Gordon to furnish a list of names and addresses of 
employees eligible to vote in a "recognition" election. The order was 
based on a general pronouncement derived from a prior 
administrative adjudication, Excelsior Underwear. 25 The appellate 
court refused to enforce a subpoena in aid of an administrative action 
against Wyman-Gordon because it found that the order was based on 
a rule made in a prior adjudication and never promulgated according 
to proper rulemaking procedures. Reversing the appellate court, the 
Supreme Court refused to compel the agency to establish agency law 
through rulemaking process before applying it to an adjudication, 
affirming the principle of administrative discretion to develop agency 
law in adjudication.26 To this day, this remains the law in the federal 
system.27 
25. Excelsior Underwear, 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). 
26. Strauss' observations about the increasing challenges to the common-law 
process are relevant to its administrative version: 
We could see a number of linked results from these 
challenges: a heightening of judicial discretion over what issues 
get decided; an emphasis on Jaw-making rather than case-
deciding as the basis on which this discretion gets exercised; a 
dramatically lowered exposure of trial and intermediate courts to 
principled public correction; and a temptation for the high court, 
then, to speak in simple terms it might expect to have broad 
impact rather than respond to the subtle particulars of complex 
facts. 
Peter L. Strauss, Courts or Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 
ALA. L. REV. 891, 894-95 (2002). 
27. A plurality of the justices indicated that, but for the unique aspects of this 
particular case, they would require an agency to make a rule through rulemaking 
procedure rather than allow it to announce rules of general applicability in the 
course of an individual adjudication. Most administrative law practitioners belived 
that if the question came up without the special facts in Wyman-Gordon, the 
Supreme Court would demand rulemaking procedures for general administrative 
pronouncements. This case arrived at the Supreme Court in the form of NLRB v. 
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). Here again, the NLRB seemed to have 
set a rule without using rulemaking procedures. The Board certified buyers in the 
company's purchasing and procurement department as a bargaining unit. /d.at 269. 
The company argued that buyers had always been considered "managerial 
employees" and that the agency's decision changed the law. /d. The appellate court 
agreed and said that the agency must use rulemaking to change general agency 
policy. !d. The Supreme Court remanded the decision so that the NLRB could 
apply the proper legal standard, but it refused to require that the NLRB use 
rulemaking procedures. The Court said that an agency "is not precluded from 
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Wyman-Gordon additionally softened the distinction between rule 
and precedent in the administrative adjudicative context. Formally, 
judgments in individual cases focus on resolving past issues in an 
individual dispute, while rules focus on future agency policy. 
Nonetheless, by definition, precedent has general applicability and 
future effect.28 More to the point, adjudicators, especially the agency 
heads, often consciously aim to create agency law in their 
adjudicative decisions-although usually not so blatantly as the 
NLRB in the Excelsior case. Justice Black, concurring in Wyman-
Gordon, challenged the plurality's suggestion that an agency may not 
make a prospective pronouncement in an adjucation.29 Noting the 
fuzzy boundary between rulemaking and adjudication, Black 
observed: 
[l]n exerclSlng its quasi-judicial function an 
agency must frequently decide controversies on the 
basis of new doctrines, not theretofore applied to a 
specific problem, though drawn to be sure from 
announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and that the choice 
between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the [agency's] 
discretion." !d. at 294. Thus, the Court reaffirmed the well-established principle 
that an agency may develop policy through adjudication. 
While an adjudicative decision may have future effect as precedent, its 
primary purpose is to resolve the dispute and its effect is said to be retrospective. 
Unlike adjudicative decisions, administrative rules are prospective, and are 
intended to have future effect as well as general applicability. Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia J., concurring). In a 
manual published shortly after the APA's enactment to advise federal agencies, the 
Attorney General explained the difference: 
The object of the rule making proceeding is the 
implementation or prescription of law or policy for the future, 
rather than the evaluation of a respondent's past conduct. 
Typically, the issues relate not to the evidentiary facts, as to 
which the veracity and demeanor of witnesses would often be 
important, but rather to the policy-making conclusions to be 
drawn from the facts. 
ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATNE PROCEDURE ACT 14 
(1947); see also United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 244-46 
(1973). 
29. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 775 (Black J., concurring) ("I see no good 
reason to impose any such inflexible requirement on the administrative agencies."). 
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broader principles reflecting the purposes of the 
statutes involved and from the rules invoked in 
dealing with related problems. If the agency decision 
reached under the adjudicatory power becomes a 
precedent, it guides future conduct in much the same 
way as though it were a new rule promulgated under 
the rule-making power .... 30 
25-1 
This affirmed the position Black took in a dissent some 26 years 
before in Chenery I, arguably the position adopted by the Court five 
years later in Chenery II.31 In Chenery I, Black asserted that an 
agency is free to "evolve" its law, relying on the wisdom of prior 
judicial opinion among other sources,32 "[t]hat the Commission has 
chosen to proceed case by case rather than by a general 
pronouncement does not appear to me to merit criticism . . . . That 
Act gives the Commission wide powers to evolve policy standards, 
and this may well be done case by case .... "33 The time span 
between these cases and the present has evolved this view into one of 
the most well-established doctrines of administrative law.34 
Thus, as it should be, policy is made in administrative 
adjudications just as it is made in common-law judicial processes. 
The common-law system recognizes the value of this interstitial 
30. !d. at 770-71. 
31. !d. at 772. 
32. Chenery /,supra note 16, at 97-98. 
33. /d. at 99-100. 
34. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUll.., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 279 (3d ed. 1999) ("[A]n agency can establish 
general rules applicable to large groups of people through an order issued in a 
proceeding conducted as an adjudication."}; ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. 
MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 102 (2001). 
The idea of rulemaking by adjudication is that over time and 
out of a sequence of adjudications aimed at discrete problems as 
they present themselves, agency standards of broad application 
should emerge. This notion ... has been sufficiently strong to 
make the case that an agency should have the discretion to 
determine whether a particular problem is better solved by 
rulemaking by making rules through adjudication. 
/d.; KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 6.8 ("Efforts to require rulemaking have failed in federal law."); 1 
KOCH, supra note 2, § 2.12. 
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policymaking. Because adjudicative policymaking takes place within 
administrative structures exercising considerable policymaking 
responsibility, administrative adjudicators have both a richer 
opportunity and graver responsibility than their counterparts in the 
conventional judiciary. A careful analysis of this aspect of 
administrative adjudication requires considerable attention. 
Essentially, policymaking starts at the beginning of the adjudicative 
process, and administrative judges have a critical role in optimizing 
policymaking. Therefore, the focus must be on improving the 
administrative judges' understanding of their role in the process. 
II. THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF ADMINISTRA11VE LAW JUDGES 
As discussed above, administrative adjudications are part of the 
administrative policymaking process, and administrative 
policymaking is pervasive and dynamic. The next step is to look 
inside the adjudicative machinery at the distribution of policymaking 
responsibilities. Traditional judicial organization dictates the 
structure of the administrative adjudicative process, and that structure 
helps us to understand the allocation of policymaking responsibility. 
The Anglo-American trial is the template for adjudications?5 
However, while administrative adjudications use the trial as a model, 
they may and often do deviate from that model, sometimes 
substantially. 36 Nonetheless, the basic structure replicates court 
35. The trial-like model, or "formal adjudication," is sometimes required by 
statute. E.g., APA, supra note I I,§§ 554, 556-57; 61 MSAPA, supra note I I,§ 9; 
MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 0981) Article IV, chap. II 
[hereinafter 8 I MSAP A]. 
36. In developing procedural designs, administrative law has often been 
eclectic, especially in its early years. For that reason, it has looked with a more 
positive attitude and practical eye at the civil-Jaw systems. Because this Article is 
about one of the functions of adjudicators, it sometimes makes reference to the 
judicial function and procedural usage of the civil-law system. References to the 
civil-law system free the inquiry from the common-law procedural dogma because 
the civil system is based on a very active role for trial-level judges. Henry Friendly, 
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1290 (1975). The civil system is 
judge controlled, as opposed to the common-law model which is lawyer controlled. 
The civil system focuses on the judge and judges play the crucial role. It is called 
the "inquisitorial" model because its doctrines aim at gaining the truth. It is no less 
adversarial than the common-law "adversarial" model, as decisions are contested 
60 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-1 
systems in terms of the hierarchy of adjudicators as well as the trial-
like hearing procedures employed?7 Therefore, an agency engaging 
in adjudications has a hearing-level adjudication, much like a trial 
court, and at least one opportunity for appeal within the agency. The 
administrative process may employ a nearly infinite number of 
variations on this basic adjudicative structure and any discussion of 
the allocation of policymaking within the administrative 
adjudications must account for this structural diversity.38 However, 
this presents little difficulty for this discussion, because even very 
informal adjudicative processes have a hierarchy of adjudicators 
which match closely enough to conventional judicial organization. 
Analyzing the administrative adjudicative hierarchy requires 
some agreement on the terms used to distinguish adjudicative 
responsibilities. The administrative officials, at all levels, engaged in 
adjudicative decisionmaking will be called "administrative 
adjudicators." These administrative adjudicators are distinguished 
from judiciary branch judges, collectively called "the courts" or 
"conventional judges." Hearing-level administrative adjudicators will 
be called "administrative judges."39 Higher-level administrative 
adjudicators will be called the "administrative review authority" or 
among judges as well as lawyers. The difference may be that the judges have a 
moral responsibility to assure an equal and fair process, a responsibility not just to 
ensure that the rules of the game are observed, but also that the decision is the best 
possible. In this fundamental sense, civil-law judges share a key ethic with 
administrative judges in many systems. 
37. See generally LLOYD D. MUSOLF, FEDERAL EXAMINERS AND THE 
CONFLICT OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATION (1953); Gerald M. Pops, The 
Judicialization of Federal Administrative Law Judges: Implications for 
Policymaking, 81 W.VA. L. REV. 169 (1979). 
38. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001) ("That feature 
is the great variety of ways in which the laws invest the Government's 
administrative arms with discretion, and with procedures for exercising it, in giving 
meaning to Acts of Congress."). 
39. A literal reading of the Constitution may require Congress to vest all 
judicial functions in Article III courts, but long tradition has established alternative 
federal courts and agencies with adjudicative functions. Richard Fallon, Of 
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article Ill, 101 HARV. L. REv. 
916, 916-17 (1988) (remarking that "Article III literalism" is "unthinkable"). Many 
federal and state statutes refer to administrative adjudicative officials as "judges" of 
some variety. 
Spring 2005 Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary 61 
simply the "review authority."40 The pinnacle of authority in the 
agency will be termed the "agency head," referring to either a single 
official or a collegial body. The review authority may be the agency 
head or some individual or body delegated the authority to review the 
administrative judge's decision. In the end, the agency, as an 
institution, must adopt a policy position iil order for it to have weight 
and hence the administrative review authority, either the agency head 
or its representative, has the final word-the power to speak for the 
"agency" as a whole.41 Thus, the hierarchical system centralizes the 
policymaking authority in a superior review authority, but the 
administrative judges, sitting at the initial adjudicative stage, 
necessarily play a critical role. This Article adopts the perspective 
that all adjudicative officials act on and depend upon the work of 
administrative judges. 
40. The term "administrative judge" represents a search for a universal term. It 
includes all officials-federal, state or local-who have hearing-level adjudicative 
responsibilities, regardless of official title. The nature of the hearings over which 
they preside varies in the level of formality, and often their specific title is affected 
by the nature of the hearing. Administrative law has used any number of terms: 
hearing examiner, hearing officer, or some term including the word "judge." 
Previously, I have grouped them as "presiding officials." 2 KOCH, supra note 2, § 
5.26. This term does not carry the necessary stature; these adjudicators are judges, 
even if they are not acting under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Increasingly, 
"administrative law judge (ALJ)" has been adopted as the generic term. 
Unfortunately, the federal system creates some confusion because the term 
"administrative law judge" has become a special civil service category, whereas all 
other federal presiding officials are lumped together as "administrative judges." 
PAUL VERKUIT.., ET AL., THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 7 (1992); see 
also John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-AU Hearings Programs in the Federal 
Government, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 261 (1992). The distinction is necessary because 
ALJs have special protection, whereas other presiding officials hired by agencies 
have no more than the usual civil service protection. States do not adopt this 
distinction and their law may employ any of a number of terms. To escape this 
morass, I have adopted "administrative judge" as a universal term. 
41. Daniel Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an 
Alternative Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 965, 980 (1991) ("This role 
of the agency head as the final adjudicating authority is recognized throughout the 
[Administrative Procedure] Act."). 
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A. Administrative Judges' Contribution to the Body of Agency 
Case law 
The role of the administrative judges is pivotal. Administrative 
judges cannot decide individual cases without finding and applying 
administrative policy.42 A sense of obedience to that policy is driven 
by the norms of stability and consistency regarding adjudicative 
decisions and equality among litigants, assuring that like cases are 
treated alike. On the other hand, a living administrative policy regime 
requires constant adjustment. Wooden adherence to dictated policy 
tips the balance too far in favor of laissezfaire. The balance between 
growth and equal treatment pervades the adjudicative system. The 
interaction between the "inferior" and the "superior" administrative 
adjudicators dictates to some extent how that balance is struck in a 
particular administrative program.43 
42. While decorum demands that the administrative judges say that they take 
policy rather than make policy, this is no more true of administrative judges than it 
is of trial-level judges. 
[W]hile the primary task of trial judges is factfinding, legal 
reasoning and interpretation of legal texts remains a vital part of 
the work of a federal district judge. Indeed, some researchers 
have concluded that the federal trial bench is a better-suited 
laboratory for study of judicial discretion than the federal 
appellate courts. 
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on 
the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
1377, 1415 (1998) (citing Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. 
Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case 
Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 263-64 (1995)). While administrative judges 
focus on factfinding, they often find the need to consider policy issues. Justice 
Scalia's list of judicial functions still works. He observed that, in addition to 
determining credibility, administrative judges 
perform many other important functions: they make findings 
of fact of an often extraordinarily difficult nature, not primarily 
dependent upon the credibility of demeanor evidence; they make 
important decisions regarding statutory law and agency policy; 
they write opinions that marshal the facts and frame the issues in 
a comprehensible fashion; and they conduct proceedings so as to 
assure a full and informative record. 
Antonin Scalia, The AU Fiasco-A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 71 (1979) 
(emphasis added). "These functions are absolutely vital to the administrative 
process." !d. 
43. For example, a North Carolina statute requires the administrative judge to 
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The common perception is that administrative adjudicators are 
likely to be too committed to the agency's positions.44 For example, 
veterans' cases give rise to the complaint that the agency appoints 
judges who are imbued with the agency's culture.45 Nonetheless, the 
frequency with which adjudicators actually disagree with agency 
policy is not particularly relevant to this discussion, although the 
impact of those disagreements and the disturbance in the 
administrative scheme are significant, even if they occur infrequently. 
Moreover, the point of inquiry is how free administrative judges 
should feel in venturing to disagree with agency policy.46 
1. Precedent 
This analysis begins with the question of the binding effect of 
agency law created through adjudication. Stare decisis is not the rule 
in administrative adjudications.47 Thus, as a matter of doctrine, 
give "due regard to the demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the agency with 
respect to facts and inferences within the specialized knowledge of the agency." 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (2005); see Julian Mann III, Administrative Justice: 
No Longer Just a Recommendation, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1639, 1651-52 (2001) 
(observing that demonstrating expertise often presents a problem). 
44. Daye's study provides support for this perception. Charles E. Daye, 
Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and 
Empirical Assessment, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1571, 1617 (2001) ("Thus, the small 
proportion of decisions that favored the petitioners in the OAH is one part of the 
picture."); Parchman v. USDA, 852 F.2d 858, 866 (6th Cir.1988). 
!d. 
[A) judge should be careful not to give the impression that a 
particular view of the law prevents a careful consideration of the 
law and facts applicable to any given case. When an entire career 
has been spent in the service of one governmental agency, it can 
be easy for a judge to slip into a stance that may appear to be 
advocating, rather than judging, those interests. 
45. James T. O'Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals 
Process is Needed to Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 223, 228 
(2001). 
46. Daye found that, while administrative judges agreed with the agency about 
three-quarters of the time, they disagreed in a significant number of cases. Daye, 
supra note 44, at 1616. 
47. Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1556 (5th Cir. 1989) ("An agency . 
. . is not bound by the shackles of stare decisis to follow blindly the interpretations 
that it, or the courts of appeals, have adopted in the past."). 
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administrative adjudicators are not required to follow administrative 
precedent.48 Rather, administrative law has developed a degree of 
flexibility in its approach to caselaw. On the other hand, agencies 
cannot ignore their prior cases.49 Thus, they are allowed to 
continually adjust their precedent so long as they apply the new view 
until faced with a sound reason for adjusting that view;50 they are 
held to precedent only until a change can be justified. 51 The effect of 
precedent is further weakened by the agency's authority to interpret 
it. An agency has the power to interpret its own precedent as well as 
48. S. Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 308 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(holding that an agency may refine, reformulate, or even reverse its precedent based 
on new insights, changed circumstances, and the desire to correct a mistake). 
49. Borough of Columbia v. Surface Transp. Bd., 342 F.3d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 
2003) ("If an agency departs from its own precedent without a reasoned 
explanation, the agency may be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously."); 
Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 1121, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[A]gency action is 
arbitrary and capricious if it departs from agency precedent without explanation."); 
Consol. Edison Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003) ("Normally, an agency must adhere to its precedents in adjudicating 
cases before it."). 
50. South Shore Hasp., Inc., 308 F.3d at 102 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 
173, 186-87 (1991), and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29,42 (1983)). 
51. Borough of Columbia, 342 F.3d at 229; Fertilizer Inst. v. Browner, 163 
F.3d 774, 778 (3d Cir. 1998); Utahns for Better Transp. v. United States Dep't of 
Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1165 (lOth Cir. 2002) ("Agencies are under an obligation 
to follow their own regulations, procedures, and precedents, or provide a rational 
explanation for their departure.") (emphasis added); Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at 
1124; British Steel PLC v. United States, 127 F.3d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
But see McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 131 F.3d 1026, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (allowing an agency to overrule portions of prior decisions without extensive 
explanation), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). The explanation requirement 
varies with the circumstances of the individual case. "If . . . an agency merely 
implements prior policy, an explanation that allows this court to discern 'the 
agency's path' will suffice." WLOS TV, Inc. v. FCC, 932 F.2d 993, 995 (D.C. Cir. 
1991 ). Or, if the court finds the past agency decisions to involve materially different 
situations, the agency's explanation need not be particularly elaborate. Hall v. 
McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The D.C. Circuit allowed an 
agency to "distinguish precedent simply by emphasizing the importance of 
considerations not previously contemplated, and that in so doing it need not refer to 
the cases being distinguished by name." Envtl. Action v. FERC, 996 F.2d 401,411-
12 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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to make justifiable adjustments to the precedent.52 Thus, in 
application, administrative precedent has effect, but the effect is not 
binding, or stare decisis.53 
Administrative law replaces formalism with an approach to 
caselaw that balances a range of values. Stare decisis recognizes, but 
overemphasizes, one of these values: stability.54 The notion of 
stability serves the individual values of predictability and reliance.55 
Undoubtedly, these considerations are important to a fair 
administrative system. Citizens should be able to rely on a current 
understanding of agency law and take action under some reliable 
prediction of administrative reaction. Administration should seek 
52. See Entergy Serv., Inc. v. FERC, 319 F.3d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2003); 
Cassell v. FCC, 154 F.3d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("An agency's interpretation of 
its own precedent is entitled to deference .... "). 
53. A strict doctrine of stare decisis is not followed by modem courts-if it 
ever was. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) ("The doctrine of stare 
decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the 
stability of the law. It is not, however, an inexorable command."); see James C. 
Rehnquist, The Power That Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the 
Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REv. 345, 347 (1986); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68, 91 ( 1991) ("These sources of indeterminancy in dealing 
with precedents have the effect of enabling the Justices to engage in conscientious 
disagreements over the scope of precedents, to consider new or renewed arguments, 
and to contribute to the evolution of constitutional doctrine."). Still, administrative 
adjudicators are free in principle as well as practicality. 
54. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 601 ("Arguments premised on the 
values of reliance, predictability, and decisional efficiency all share a focus on 
stability for stability's sake."). 
55. Predictability and stability are integral to assuring the rule of law. See 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18-21 (1997); Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits 
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 357 (1978). 
/d. 
[A]djudication should be viewed as a form of social 
ordering, as a way in which the relations of men to one another 
are governed and regulated. Even in the absence of any 
formalized doctrine of stare decisis or res judicata, an 
adjudicative determination will normally enter in some degree 
into the litigants' future relations and into the future relations of 
other parties who see themselves as possible litigants before the 
same tribunal. 
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consistency over time and within a program, 56 yet each new precedent 
potentially eliminates a viable option.57 Schauer, while recognizing 
the value of predictability, observed the trade-off between 
predictability and other values. 58 He asks, without providing a 
generalized answer: "To what extent is a decisionmaking 
environment willing to tolerate suboptimal results in order that 
people may plan their lives according to decisions previously 
made?"59 
A strong commitment to precedent would prevent agencies from 
responding to changing circumstances and new understandings. 
Agencies must be given the freedom to adjust to the real world and to 
56. The doctrine of precedent in general furthers both temporal stability and 
equality: 
This concern for equal treatment usually surfaces in 
discussions about the temporal stability of legal rules, because 
stare decisis promotes the equal treatment of individuals over 
time. But equal treatment in a spatial sense seems an equally 
compelling goal. . . . [G]eographical variation in otherwise 
uniform rules caused by divergent judicial interpretations seems 
irrational and unfair. 
Caminker, supra note 4, at 852. Geographic or intra-program variation would seem 
particularly repugnant in most administrative schemes. See generally Samuel 
Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative 
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 735-36 ( 1989). 
57. The evolution of agency law on a case-by-case basis creates a path 
dependency problem. Each move in an individual case may cut off more 
advantageous moves in the future. See ALPHA C. CHIANG, ELEMENTS OF DYNAMIC 
OPTIMIZATION 5 (1992) ("This [example] serves to point out a very important fact: 
A myopic, one-stage-at-a-time optimization procedure will not in general yield the 
optimal path!"). The more adjudicators are held to past decisions, the less likely the 
system is to arrive at the optimum results when new needs are revealed in some 
future case. 
58. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 598 ("[T]he value of predictability is 
really a question of balancing expected gain against expected loss."). 
59. !d. at 597. Kornhauser shows that this judgment is complicated by the 
tension between efficient outcomes during different time periods. Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 63, 
89 ( 1989) ("In some contexts, therefore, a court will maximize social welfare by 
adhering to a legal rule that fails to maximize social welfare in the particular 
period."); see also Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and 
Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHL-KENT L. REv.93, 113 (1989) (conceding that this 
observation, while critical, "greatly has enriched our understanding of a complex 
legal phenomenon"). 
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learn from experience. The First Circuit expressed this well-
established administrative law principle: "Experience is often the best 
teacher, and agencies retain a substantial measure of freedom to 
refine, reformulate, and even reverse their precedents in the light of 
new insights and changed circumstances."60 Therefore, the system 
allows administrative adjudicators to weigh the need for dynamic 
policymaking against predictability and reliance values.61 
For these reasons, administrative law softens the formalism of 
stare decisis, but it does not dismiss the values which support 
attention to precedent. While eschewing a strong doctrine of 
precedent, administrative law has adopted a balanced requirement of 
consistency which dictates that, in general, like circumstances should 
be treated alike.62 That is, administrative law demands consistency in 
agency adjudicative decisions as in all other administrative decisions, 
60. Davila-Bardales v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 27 F.3d I, 5 (lst 
Cir. 1994). But see Prof'! Airways Sys. Specialists v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 
809 F.2d 855, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Fidelity to law requires more than mechanical 
incantations about the life and growth of the law."). 
61. This freedom is recognized in the principles of judicial review. 
Administrative policy decisions are reviewed for arbitrariness. Often this review 
takes the form of "hard look" review, where the reviewing court assures that the 
agency took a hard look at the issues. The court would arrogate policymaking 
power if it took a hard look itself. For a further discussion, see 3 KOCH, supra note 
2, § 12.31. In short, judicial review law facilitates policymaking by allowing the 
agencies great freedom. This freedom is not justified by the studies of skewed 
judicial decisionmaking used in Part III for insights into potential influences acting 
on the administrative judiciary, but rather by the understanding that agencies, not 
courts, are assigned the task of, and are better able to make, policy decisions. The 
liberty review law provides the agencies with great scope and hence the quality and 
fairness of policy depends on the administrative policymaking itself. Administrative 
adjudication must be examined as one of the vehicles of that policymaking. 
62. Henry v. INS, 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996). 
[A]gencies do not have carte blanche. While a certain 
amount of asymmetry is lawful, an agency may not 'adopt[ ] 
significantly inconsistent policies that result in the creation of 
conflicting lines of precedent governing the identical situation.' .. 
. In other words, administrative agencies must apply the same 
basic rules to all similarly situated supplicants. 
Id. (quoting Davila-Bardales v. INS, 27 F.3d I, 5 (1st Cir. 1994), and Williston 
Basin Int'l Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 54, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citations 
omitted). 
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but consistency attentive to the need for dynamic administration. 
2. Superior Precedent 
Policies expressed by the agency head in prior opmwns affect 
adjudicative decisions throughout the adjudicative hierarchy. We can 
start to understand the nature of the effect on administrative judges by 
looking closely at the general principles of hierarchical judicial 
control. Understanding the dynamics of administrative adjudication 
policy, as with judicial lawmaking, starts with understanding the 
nature and extent of the obedience generally required of lower-level 
adjudicators. Caminker provides us with an extensive body of useful 
scholarship on the question of the lawmaking function of "inferior" 
courts.63 Although the "inferior" courts Caminker studies are those 
below the Supreme Court, his observations about the policymaking 
relationship offer insights useful for analyzing the administrative 
adjudicative hierarchy. 
Caminker posits a nonhierarchical system in which courts at all 
levels have equal lawmaking authority.64 Interestingly, such a system 
is not merely hypothetical. As strange as such a system might feel to 
common-law lawyers, Caminker notes the error in dismissing the 
system as implausible because the system apparently works in civil-
law countries.65 Moreover, some administrative systems, especially in 
63. Caminker, supra note 4, at 1515 (noting that levels of the judiciary "enjoy 
somewhat different packages of judicial power vis-a-vis each other, depending on 
their specific role and placement within the integrated and hierarchical Article III 
system"). 
64. Caminker, supra note 4, at 826. 
/d. 
One can certainly imagine an institutional regime in this 
country in which district courts, courts of appeals, and the 
Supreme Court all behave as autonomous law-declaring actors ... 
. [T]he non-precedent-based hierarchy would grant district courts 
great lawmaking power, subject only to case-by-case error 
correction by superior courts in a limited number of instances. 
65. It is legitimate to say that lower courts are not bound by higher court 
decisions as in the common-law systems, hence they may and do engage in 
"underru1ing." But, there is a difference between formality and practice here. As a 
leading comparative law text observes: 
A quick look round the Continent shows that matters are not 
really very different there. It is true that there is never any legal 
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the states to be discussed in subpart V.A, are increasingly giving the 
administrative judges such autonomy. Caminker examines the 
possible gains accrued from disobedience by an inferior adjudicative 
authority, or "underruling." Disobedience may spur reform; indeed, 
some refusal to follow prior authority is a necessary element to 
reevaluation. Still, in the end, Caminker concludes that the benefits of 
disobedience are ambiguous, conceding that "one might identify 
discrete instances in which the benefits of forced rethinking likely 
outweigh the costs, but a flat prohibition of underruling might better 
balance benefits and costs over the entire range of cases."66 These 
observations support a cabined opportunity for experimentation and 
even disobedience at the administrative judge level.67 
Administrative judges al~o have an interpretative function that 
gives them some opportunities with respect to precedent. Caminker 
posits two distinct uses an inferior adjudicative authority might make 
of precedent even if they felt generally obligated to apply prior 
decisions. Under a literal model, the lower courts make decisions 
according to their best understanding of the current law of the 
superior court.68 Under Caminker's "proxy model," the lower court 
rule which compels a judge to follow the decisions of a higher 
court, but the reality is different. In practice a judge of the 
[French or German appellate court] today can count on being 
followed by lower courts just as much as a judgment of an appeal 
court in England or in the United States. 
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 262 
(1998). 
66. Caminker, supra note 4, at 864-65. 
67. One study of judges found that more qualified judges "were significantly 
more likely to strike out from the mainstream and adopt marginal theories." Sisk et 
al., supra note 42, at 1481. In short, the better the judges, the more likely they are 
to venture to improve agency policy. It is likely that they will also make a real 
contribution in doing so. This finding suggests that the better administrative judges 
will display exactly the kind of "disobedience" that will contribute to the 
policymaking enterprise. This not only confirms that we should seek the best 
administrative judges, but my study found that federal administrative judges (state 
judges were not studied) have fairly high qualifications. Charles Koch, Jr., 
Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 271, 290 (1994) 
("The quality of the presiding officials as a group is impressive and there is little 
difference between the qualifications of AUs and AJs [judges with formal APA 
protection and those without]."). 
68. Caminker terms this model, somewhat confusingly, the "precedent" model, 
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attempts to put itself in the place of the superior court and predict 
how that court would decide the case.69 Caminker found that "it is 
difficult to credit the claim that inferior courts obey superior court 
precedents because inferior courts must independently interpret the 
law and the precedents count as a part of that law-indeed, a part 
superior to other sources of written law."70 He suggests instead that 
"when there is a higher court precedent on point, lower courts do not 
themselves interpret and apply the law; rather, they apply the law as 
their superior court has interpreted it."71 Thus, an administrative 
judge, like a lower court, is using the precedent rather than "obeying" 
it. The administrative judge is attempting to predict how the agency 
will decide the case rather than simply following prior decisions. 
Whether an inferior adjudicator should approach superior precedent 
in this way is not clear: "[P]redictive behavior ought to be deemed a 
proper exercise of judicial power if it is consistent with the 
institutional values .... "72 Thus, the agency and its adjudicators 
might best interact on the issue. Caminker would not choose the 
predictive model unless it would "actually generate greater 
correspondence" within the adjudicative hierarchy.73 Caminker finds 
that obedience generally should be the norm, with some allowance 
for creative deviation. 
Obedience to the highest authority's decisions produces the 
economic results of fewer cases and efficient resolution of recurring 
issues. Schauer found, as a major justification relevant to 
administrative adjudications, that obedience conserves 
decisionmaking resources.74 Caminker tested the proposition that 
"the desire to reduce the inefficiencies a multitiered adjudicatory 
process generates justifies present doctrine."75 He found that "judicial 
economy provides a strong rationale for a duty to obey hierarchical 
even though the two models both begin with the precedent. Evan H. Caminker, 
Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspect of Inferior Court 
Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1994). 
69. !d. at 16. 
70. !d. at 26. 
71. !d. at 27 (referring to this as the "subject-transfer" perspective). 
72. /d. at 31. 
73. /d. at 44. This finding depends on the data used to make the predictions. 
74. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 599. 
75. Caminker, supra note 4, at 839. 
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precedent only in certain contexts."76 
The call for obedience in the administrative adjudicative context 
is heightened by the evolution of the administrative judge position. 
Shapiro observed that obedience to higher precedent in the 
administrative process should recognize the sub-delegation of 
authority from which the administrative judges act.77 The 
adjudicative hierarchy, including the evolution of today's 
administrative judges, began because the agency heads could not 
preside at hearings themselves.78 Thus, administrative judges began 
as agents of the agency head and have retained this character despite 
evolving into a discrete institution. In this respect, they are quite 
distinct from the lower courts. Attention to the dictates of the higher 
authority, at least in policy matters, is compelled by administrative 
law's general allocation of authority as well as the aforementioned 
generalized benefits for sound adjudication.79 
The judicial approach to superior precedent has ramifications for 
the public at large. If judges do no more than apply the precedent as it 
exists, guidance information is available and concrete. The more 
judges stray from strict application and literal interpretation, the less 
confidence the public has in its understanding of agency policy. 
Hence, freeing the judges leaves the litigant and the public less sure 
of agency law. However, it also presents the public with an 
opportunity in the face of contrary law. The approach to superior 
precedent then creates a continuum between certainty and clarity on 
76. !d. at 841. 
77. Sidney Shapiro, comments (on file with the author). 
78. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITIEE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 43 (1941) ("The heads of the agency cannot, through 
press of duties, sit to hear all the cases which must be decided."). 
79. This history explains to some extent why administrative appellate review is 
de novo. The federal APA codifies this tradition when it provides: "On appeal from 
or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have 
in making the initial decision .... " 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000); Janka v. Dep't of 
Transp., 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that Section 557(b) provides 
that the decision of a presiding officer does not become the decision of the agency 
if there is "an appeal to ... the agency" and that the agency may therefore conduct 
"plenary review of an ALJ's decision"). However, some administrative schemes, 
particularly in the states, impose more limited review. Rossi, supra note 23, at 572. 
If such a scheme is limited to the administrative review authority's ability to 
"correct" findings of fact, the shift of burden can be justified. 
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the one hand and the opportunity, both for the agency and the 
litigants, for dynamism and tailoring to individual circumstances. 
Administrative law recognizes that a strong sense of precedent 
may affect the system's ability to do individual justice. In his study of 
the massive Social Security Administration adjudications, Mashaw 
observed: 
Objectification of standards, the use of 
presumptions, the routtmzation of evidentiary 
development, all tend to overgeneralize, to 
pigeonhole, to leave gaps. Rulemaking necessarily 
constrains sensitive exercise of individualized 
discretion. This characteristic of clear decision rules, 
like vagueness, can introduce errors or skew them 
systematically and inappropriately in one direction.80 
In recognition of this dilemma, administrative law has adopted 
the view that wooden reliance on precedent may create unfairness and 
injustice if not tempered with individualizing discretionY 
While the judges should have some freedom then to adjust or 
even disobey superior precedent, reasonably strong control by the 
administrative review authority is necessary to allow it to balance 
flexibility and growth of agency policy against consistency and 
equality. 82 The opinions of higher adjudicative authorities have the 
80. JERRY MASAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABll.ITY CLAIMS 107 (1983) (emphasis added). 
81. Brehmer v. FAA, 294 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
/d. 
A "policy" is just that . . . . It indicates the standards an 
agency generally will follow in conducting its operations. It is 
not, however, a black letter rule that the agency is required to 
follow in all cases without regard to the circumstances of the 
particular situation before it. 
82. Administrative adjudicators, like courts, are likely to attempt to protect 
their policy choices. Studies demonstrate that judges formulate their actions so as to 
protect their policy preferences. Smith and Tiller delved into the strategies lower 
courts undertake to protect their policy choices. Joseph Smith & Emerson Tiller, 
The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61 
(2002). Thus, they identify that "a key insight of the strategic instrument theory is 
that the policy choice of the court is reflected through a combination of the court's 
policy outcome and instrument selection, not through the policy outcome alone." /d. 
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benefit of analysis percolating through the adjudicative machinery 
with the lower-level adjudicators providing differing analyses and 
reaching different conclusions in individual cases.83 Lower-level 
policy-related freedom requires the availability of administrative 
review to assure against improper or incorrect policy determinations. 
Justice seems best served by a norm of obedience in which the lower-
level adjudicators generally seek to obey agency policy expressed in 
superior precedent, and where an administrative review authority 
representing the agency as an institution is available to test that 
obedience but take advantage of studied disobedience. 
So, in many ways, rather than engaging in the "correction" of the 
policy conclusions of administrative judges, the agency is capturing 
the benefits of different perspectives. The judges bring an individual 
and a "street-level" perspective, and the agency adds sensitivity to 
societal and cumulative values. 84 The system acquires some balance 
when the administrative judges force the agency to justify cumulative 
objectives as against practical reality and individual consequences. 
On the other hand, like trial judges, administrative judges are not held 
to the same level of external scrutiny.85 The review stage serves the 
dual function of holding a judge responsible outside the hearing room 
and allowing for the open analysis of a judge's initiatives. Thus, a 
review authority must have the final say, but it should measure lower-
level decisions against policy integrity, the potential for 
improvements on the prior policy position, and valuable specificity in 
at 68. Both the judge and the agency are likely to choose actions that protect their 
policy choices and somewhat confuse the pure policy issue. A voiding the question 
of whether the agency should act in such a way to protect its policy, its judges 
should not attempt through strategic behavior to limit the agency's policy choices. 
The judges' job, in fact, is to alert the agency to the policy issues first, and offer 
their own solution second. 
83. Caminker, supra note 4, at 860. Caminker concedes that some jurists and 
scholars are skeptical. /d. 
84. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,421 (1941) ("Cabinet officers 
charged by Congress with adjudicatory functions are not assumed to be flabby 
creatures any more than judges are. Both may have an underlying philosophy in 
approaching a specific case."); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948). 
85. See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 188 ( 1998) (noting that district court judges "sit alone and 
do not have the benefit of the intellectual debate among a panel"). 
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application. 86 
However, the appeal and review process is necessarily fitful and 
reactive, and hence often incapable of assuring either general policy 
integrity or optimum policy development.87 Although the opportunity 
for a superior tribunal to deal with a variety of lower-level 
approaches enhances the agency's policymaking, both as the ultimate 
adjudicative authority and in performing its other policymaking 
functions, the opportunity presented by review is not sufficient. More 
creative alternatives should supplement the appeal and review 
process in order to better capture these advantages. Such alternatives 
might include disciplining judges who fail to uphold policy 
integrity.88 Independence might be insured by a body comprised of 
other judges.89 More positive approaches to interaction on policy, 
86. Many administrative review authorities, but not all, are collegial as well. 
87. "In very broad terms, if the head of the agency remains relatively free to 
reverse the ALJ, the values of expertise and political accountability predominate. If 
the head of the agency is bound to defer substantially to the ALJ, the value of 
objectivity and its appearance are dominant." William R. Andersen, Judicial 
Review of State Administrative Action-Designing the Statutory Framework, 44 
ADMIN. L. REv. 523, 556 (1992). A controversy has persisted for generations as to 
the reliability or even existence of objective expertise in the administrative process. 
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2260-64 
(2001). Justice Breyer urges a return to the concept of expertise, but this view 
continues to be contested. !d. at 2262-63 (citing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE 
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 61, 73-74 (1993)); Bruce 
Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 697-715 
(2000). Ackerman is described as "another prominent member of the new expertise 
movement." Kagan, supra, at 2262 n.52. 
88. Koplow and I studied the Social Security administrative review authority, 
the "Appeals Council." We found that in mass justice programs particularly, the 
traditional appellate review apparatus was insufficient to assure "policy integrity." 
More aggressive measures, such as sampling cases involving target areas, was 
necessary-at least in an administrative adjudicative system that handles a massive 
caseload-both to assure consistency and to allow the agency to come to grips with 
complex questions raised within the expanse of SSA adjudications. Charles Koch, 
Jr. & David Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and 
Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REv. 199, 279 (1990). 
89. Consistent disobedience creates gaps which do not contribute to policy 
evolution, but can only be considered capricious and hence might justify 
disciplinary or training-type approaches. Stephens v. Merit System Personnel Bd., 
986 F.2d 493, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that decisional independence does not 
prevent an agency from requiring additional training as a disciplinary device). 
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such as conferences and training sessions, might be considered.90 The 
experience and views of judges might be sought in the context of 
rulemaking. 
3. Horizontal Precedent 
In addition to careful, but flexible, attention to opinions from the 
superior authority as a way to optimize the policymaking role of the 
administrative judge, a judge also contributes by providing opinions 
for colleagues.91 "Horizontal" precedent, the impact of prior 
Members of the conventional judiciary face administrative discipline for failing to 
faithfully apply the law, and administrative judges should also face some discipline 
for failures regarding agency law. Steven Lubet, a judicial ethics expert, describes 
as unacceptable instances in which "[s]ome judges have demonstrated utter 
ignorance of the law, or sheer disregard for it, some going so far as to decide cases 
on the basis of 'coin flips."' Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and Judicial 
Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 59, 72 (1998). Under such 
circumstances, disciplinary machinery is necessary to assure accountability. Lubet 
identified four compelling circumstances justifying disciplinary action based on 
legal misconduct: (1) a pattern of repeated and uncorrected legal error; (2) errors 
exceeding some "egregiousness quotient," including "[a] willful refusal to follow 
the law, as distinct from an honest and acknowledged difference of opinion or 
interpretation, may manifest unfitness for judicial office"; (3) legal errors which 
cannot be corrected on appeal; and (4) decisions constituting a "complete 
abdication of the judicial function." !d. at 72-74. The key is curing these consistent 
breakdowns in accountability without compromising independence. !d. at 65 
("Accountability and independence are not mutually exclusive; most often, we can 
have both."). 
90. Something like this was attempted in the Social Security Administration. 
"The SSAB [Social Security Advisory Board] was created as an oversight body 
when the SSA became an independent agency in March of 1995. But the SSAB, 
though effective at the conceptual level, is not in a position to carry out actual 
management reforms." Verkuil, supra note 1, at 729. As discussed below, many 
states have constituted independent offices which supply administrative judges to 
various agencies. Under the Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency, 
the chief judge may monitor the quality of the judges' performance. Christopher 
McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency: Promises, 
Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 475, 498-500 
(2001). A long time chief ALJ disagrees with the idea that chief judges should have 
the power to impose uniform law or policy. John W. Hardwicke, The Central Panel 
Movement: A Work in Progress, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 419, 440 (2001). 
91. Judge John Hardwicke, long time chief Administrative Law Judge for 
Maryland, expressed concern over this possibility. He suggested that conversations 
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decisions by other administrative judges, raises another category of 
questions. As previously discussed, the agency adjudicators are not 
bound by prior opinions.92 Similar to an equity court, "the 
administrative judge seeks to provide individual justice. Although the 
decisions of a higher adjudicative authority may represent agency law 
that a judge cannot ignore, the opinions of comparable judges have 
no formal authority. However, to further the goals of consistency and 
informed decisionmaking, judges must not ignore the work of their 
colleagues. Schauer observed that precedent equalizing dissimilar 
decisionmakers-that is, honest disagreement among judges-while 
beneficial to the reformation of a body of law, can create 
inconsistencies incompatible with the fair resolution of individual 
cases.93 Administrative judges should conform to prior decisions, 
even those they disagree with, in order to assure an even-handed 
process.94 More specifically, an administrative system must strike a 
balance between equal treatment and individualizing discretion, and 
individual programs might weigh these two values differently in 
requiring consistency among judges. 
between the judges and the agency head were too dangerous and should not be 
permitted: "Never, never should a judge discuss on-going litigation with an 
outsider, including especially the agency or any other executive functionary." John 
Hardwicke, comments (on file with author). Nonetheless, he approved of panel 
discussions involving judges, government attorneys, members of the bar, and the 
general public. The failure to include the agency loses some of the advantage both 
for the judges and the agency, hence those representing the agency might be 
included with considerable thought to safeguards. 
92. The APA seems to require an opinion. APA, supra note 11, § 557(c). 
93. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 600. A study of the federal 
administrative judiciary concluded: 
The potential for interdecisional inconsistency increases with 
increases in the number of independent adjudicatory officers, 
increases in the difficulty of the disputes they resolve, and 
increases in the degree of subjective or normative judgment 
required to resolve the disputes. The potential for significant 
interdecisional inconsistency is a major concern because it 
violates a cardinal principle of our system of justice-like cases 
should be resolved in like manner. 
VERKUll..ET AL., supra note 40, at 139. 
94. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 588 ("The most obvious 
consequence, of course, is that a decisionmaker constrained by precedent will 
sometimes feel compelled to make a decision contrary to the one she would have 
made had there been no precedent to be followed."). 
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However, a strong sense of horizontal precedent may be unfair to 
those affected by the agency's programs, especially in mass justice 
programs. The sheer burden of collecting related cases renders 
horizontal precedent impractical for society's disadvantaged and their 
overstretched representatives.95 Indeed, this unfairness is a driving 
force behind administrative law's preference for rules. In short, 
horizontal precedent is often inappropriate for a particular 
administrative program. While administrative judges should share 
knowledge and experience in handling individual cases, true authority 
should not be given to a colleague's prior treatment of cases in most 
adjudicative settings. 96 
4. Conclusion 
Practical as well as normative factors counsel in favor of 
obedience to the decisions of a higher administrative authority. This 
obedience may be tempered by the need to render individual justice, 
and under proper circumstances, the need to begin the adjustment of 
existing agency law. However, horizontal precedent should be given 
little weight. Administrative judges may be influenced by the wisdom 
of their colleagues, but they should not feel any formal compulsion to 
follow their lead.97 Regardless, the policy role of administrative 
95. Gifford, supra note 41, at 997 ("In a mass-justice agency, adjudication is 
unsuited for use as a vehicle for announcing or formulating policy. The cases come 
too fast and in too great a volume for decisionmakers to look to other cases as 
guides .... "). 
96. Agencies should facilitate judges' ability to share their views and 
experiences in other forms and forums. Conferences and training are obvious ways 
to accomplish this. Judges might also be encouraged to consult on individual cases. 
However, to the extent it applies to administrative judges, the ABA Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct allows judges to consult with court personnel and other judges 
only for emergency and administrative purposes. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 3(c) cmt. [5] (2003) [hereinafter ABA CODE]. 
97. It is only those cases in which the judges show careful attention to the 
broader impact of their decision that other judges should consider the effect as 
something similar to precedent. On the other hand, the potential for future impact 
may distract hearing-level judges from their primary duty of deciding individual 
disputes. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 588. One study suggests that courts 
may decide not to publish opinions for fear that the opinions will create bad 
precedent. See generally Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 85. 
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judges determines the nature of adjudicative policymaking in each 
program. Each agency should be conscious of this role and 
incorporate it in to their policymaking arsenal.98 In the end, the 
agency is best situated to appraise the contribution an administrative 
judge may make to its policymaking. 
B. Incorporating Agency Rules into Adjudicative Decisions 
Administrative judges primarily rely on rules and general policy 
pronouncements for a general policy framework because most of an 
agency's policy is embodied in rules and general policy 
pronouncements rather than caselaw.99 The agency head promulgates 
98. The agency might also consider what support is available to administrative 
judges making these policy-related decisions. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 
to the extent it applies to administrative judges, provides a very narrow concession 
to consultation with legal experts. ABA CODE, supra note 96, at Canon 3B(7)(b) 
("A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law ... if the judge 
gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, 
and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond."). Consultation with 
experts in order to contribute to administrative policy, or "agency law," might be 
considered the equivalent of courts seeking legal expertise. However, this 
administrative law adaptation can be questioned. It might be consistent with the 
spirit of this provision for an administrative judge to consult a legal expert on the 
interpretation of agency policy, either in rules or precedent. !d. at cmt. 10 ( "'Law' 
denotes court rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions and decisional 
law."). But, it may stretch the spirit of this freedom too far to allow a judge to 
consult on the wisdom or modification of agency policy. In addition, the APA 
prohibition against ex parte communication may be an impediment. AP A, supra 
note 11, § 557(d); see also 81 MSAPA, supra note 36, § 4-213 (regarding the 
states). Arguably this provision, however, might leave room for consultation with 
special experts who have no stake in the outcome, and it might be read to require 
only that such consultations be noticed. To some extent, the law is more generous 
when it comes to consultation with agency staff not involved in the adjudication. 
White v. Indiana Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[N]on-record 
discussions between an agency's decision makers and members of the agency's 
staff are common and proper."); see Greenberg v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 968 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that separation of function 
standards are lower for administrative judges than federal judges). If an agency 
wants to optimize the policy contribution of its judges, it might work out some 
principled opportunity for them to consult. Formal guidelines and instructions may 
serve to legitimize support. 
99. "[T]here is rulemaking, which has in the [ 1970s] replaced adjudication as 
the central mechanism of agency law giving." Scalia, supra note 42, at 72. 
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rules, and administrative law doctrine compels the agency to obey the 
rules or justify its disobedience. Throughout the hierarchy, agency 
adjudicators-including administrative judges-are required to apply 
rules and policy pronouncements. Thus, the melding of rules and 
other policy pronouncements into individual adjudicative decisions 
raises complex questions regarding the allocation of authority within 
the administrative structure. Often administrative judges' treatment of 
policy pronouncements creates great tension within a program's 
administration. A close look at the proper role of these 
pronouncements in a program's adjudication is needed. Additionally, 
this Article will consider the possible contribution of administrative 
judges to the quality of an agency's general policy pronouncements. 
An agency must obey its own rules in order further the goal of 
consistency. 100 The basic doctrine for this requirement is derived 
from three "red baiting" cases. The first and most influential, United 
States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 101 involved efforts by the 
Attorney General to deport "unsavory characters." The petitioner 
applied for suspension of deportation, which according to INS rules, 
should have been decided by the Board of Immigration Appeals. The 
rule required the Board to exercise its discretion, and the Attorney 
General's efforts to avoid INS rules were found by the Court to be 
impermissible. Accardi was followed by two similar cases firmly 
establishing these general principles. 102 
100. A.D. Transp. Express, Inc. v. United States, 290 F.3d 761, 766 (6th Cir. 
2002) ("When an agency promulgates regulations it is . . . bound by those 
regulations."); Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("The 
Accardi doctrine requires federal agencies to follow their own rules, even gratuitous 
procedural rules that limit otherwise discretionary actions."); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. 
Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (recognizing "the principle that a court 
will require an agency to follow the legal standards contained in its own regulations 
despite the fact that a statute has granted the agency discretion in the matter"). This 
is the law in the states as well. E.g., State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Indianapolis 
Racquet Club, Inc., 743 N.E.2d 247,251-52 (Ind. 2001); Hudson v. Dep't ofCorr., 
703 A.2d 268, 273 (N.J. 1997) ("[A]n administrative agency ordinarily must 
enforce and adhere to, and may not disregard, the regulations it has promulgated."). 
101. United States ex ret. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 
102. In Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957), the Supreme Court found that 
the discharge of a foreign service officer for disloyalty violated regulations of the 
State Department. /d. at 388. Similarly, the Court in Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 
535 (1959), reinstated an Interior Department employee who had been charged with 
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Though the doctrine is well-established, it is not inflexible. 
Equally well-established is the proviso that an agency may deviate 
from its rules for good cause. 103 Administrative judges face a duty to 
be faithful to the agency's policy decisions, and this duty strengthens 
the need to obey the agency's rules and policy pronouncements. 
Additionally, a judge's failure to obey an agency policy reflects 
poorly on the agency-the judge's violation is the agency's violation. 
However, a judge may be in the best position to see reasons for an 
individual or even a general modification of an agency rule. Thus, an 
administrative judge should have flexibility to deviate from an 
established policy as long as the judge can adequately justify the 
deviation. However, because it is the agency who will ultimately be 
held accountable, the agency must make the final decision regarding a 
deviation or change. 
The question of application is complicated because administrative 
rules may have differing force and administrative adjudicators may be 
bound in differing ways. Legislative rules are promulgated pursuant 
to delegated authority through public procedures and consequently 
carry the force of law. 104 Since policy pronouncements acquire the 
force of law, an agency may have a special duty to follow its own 
"sympathetic association" with communists in violation of the Department's own 
regulations. /d. at 537. 
103. The Court in United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), established 
the principle that an agency does not violate due process when it fails to follow its 
own rules./d. at 741-42. Joshua Schwartz observed: 
Accardi contains a passing ambiguous reference that might 
suggest a due process foundation for agencies' obligation to 
follow their own regulations. But the overall tenor of the opinion 
suggests that the Court considered this obligation a necessary 
consequence of the regulations' status as law binding on private 
parties. 
Joshua I. Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel 
Remedies for an Agency's Violation of Its Own Regulation or Other Misconduct., 
44 ADMIN. L. REV. 653, 671 (1992). 
104. The foundational case is Caceres, in which the Court accepted the 
agency's assertion that following the rule would have interfered with a criminal 
investigation. 440 U.S. at 752-54; see also Revak v. Nat'l Mines Corp., 808 F.2d 
996, 1002 n.10 (3d Cir. 1986); Shell Oil Co. v. FERC, 664 F.2d 79, 83 (5th Cir. 
1981) ("In certain instances, no doubt, FERC may exercise its equitable discretion 
and stray from the use of its general regulations. In order to do so, however, FERC 
must articulate valid reasons for the departure."). 
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legislative rules unless it expresses a strong reason justifying 
disobedience. 105 Therefore, these rules bind agency adjudicators until 
the rule is amended or revoked. 106 
Such policy pronouncements are distinct from policy statements 
which do not purport to be made from delegated authority and 
consequently do not carry the force of law. 107 Though several terms 
can be used to describe these pronouncements, this Article will 
collectively call them "nonlegislative" rules. 108 Nonlegislative rules 
are a categorically different type of pronouncement from legislative 
rules, and this difference should be reflected in the weight given by 
an agency's adjudicators. 109 A nonlegislative rule is a device for 
announcing policy. 110 They are intended to disclose the agency's 
105. E.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 844 (1984) ("Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless 
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."); Chrysler 
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,296 (1979); O'Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loan, 
Inc., 319 F.3d 732, 740 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Where ... agency regulations are 
promulgated under express congressional authority, they are given controlling 
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.") 
(quoting Chevron, 476 U.S. at 844). 
106. Clean Ocean Action v. York, 57 F.3d 328, 333 (3d Cir. 1995); Cmty. 
Action, Inc. v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 347, 352 (lOth Cir. 1989). 
107. An agency may change its rules. Voyageurs Region Nat'l Park Ass'n v. 
Lujan, 966 F.2d 424, 428 (8th Cir. 1992); Romeiro De Silva v. Smith, 773 F.2d 
1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 1985) ("An agency is bound by its regulations so long as they 
remain operative, but may repeal them and substitute new rules in their place."); see 
also Macey, supra note 59, at 97 (responding to Kornhauser's observations about 
the tension between efficient outcomes in different time periods by noting that the 
legislature may change inefficient legal rules). 
108. E.g., Farrell v Dep't of Interior, 314 F.3d 584, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(concluding after a survey of authority that "[t]he general consensus is that an 
agency statement, not issued as a formal regulation, binds the agency only if the 
agency intended the statement to be binding"). 
109. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Public Procedures for the Promulgation of 
Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64 GEO. L.J. 1047, 1048 
(1976); see also Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of 
Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1977). 
110. E.g., Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. FERC, 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003). 
"Policy statements" differ from substantive rules that carry 
the "force of law," because they lack "present binding effect" on 
the agency. When an agency hears a case under an established 
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views and offer guidance regarding agency law. 111 Thus, an agency 
must obey these pronouncements as well as legislative rules unless a 
deviation can be justified. 112 
However, an administrative judge may have considerably more 
freedom regarding those policy pronouncements that are not 
legislative rules. 113 In Morton v. Ruiz, 114 the Supreme Court held that 
/d. 
policy statement, it may decide the case using that policy 
statement if the decision is not otherwise arbitrary and capricious. 
111. One brand of nonlegislative rule, "statements of policy," may not have a 
binding effect on the agency, resulting in even more ambiguous application to 
administrative judges. Several courts distinguish statements of policy from other 
nonlegislative rules because the latter are not "binding norms" which control the 
agency. For example, the D.C. Circuit described a statement of policy in these 
terms: 
An agency policy statement does not seek to impose or elaborate or 
interpret a legal norm. It merely represents an agency position with respect 
to how it will treat-typically enforce-the governing legal norm. By 
issuing a policy statement, an agency simply lets the public know its 
current enforcement or adjudicatory approach .... [P]olicy statements are 
binding on neither the public, nor the agency. 
Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
A statement might not be binding because it serves the dual purpose of 
"informing the public of the agency's future plans and priorities for exercising its 
discretionary power," as well as educating and providing direction to agency 
personnel who are required to implement the agency's policies and exercise its 
discretionary powers in specific cases. Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 
1013 (9th Cir. 1987). A statement acts only prospectively and it does not establish a 
"binding norm." /d. at 1014. Nonetheless, even a statement may confine the 
agency's discretion where it would be unfair to deny the statement some effect. 
Ronald Levin urges that statements and interpretative rules have virtually the same 
effect. Ronald M. Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 
41 DuKEL.J.1497, 1503(1992). 
112. Michael Asimow, Guidance Documents in the States: Toward a Safe 
Harbor, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 631, 632 (2002). 
/d. 
Virtually every administrative agency produces guidance 
documents expressing its view about the meaning of language in 
statutes and regulations . . . . Guidance documents of general 
applicability are enormously important to members of the public 
who seek to plan their affairs to stay out of trouble and minimize 
transaction costs. 
113. Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("The Accardi 
doctrine requires federal agencies to follow their own rules, even gratuitous 
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an agency should not feel bound by its nonlegislative rules in the face 
of overriding considerations. 115 Ruiz applied for assistance from the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and was denied assistance because of 
a provision in the BIA manual limiting eligibility to Indians living 
"on reservations." Ruiz and his wife left the reservation to live in an 
Indian community a short distance from the reservation and applied 
for assistance during a prolong~d labor strike. The Court found that 
the manual was not binding on the agency because it was not a 
legislative rule. 116 The Court held that the agency should not follow 
the nonlegislative rule where the result would be unfair. 117 
This doctrine's real impact may be felt only in situations where 
the administrative judge has some freedom in application. Thus, the 
impact of nonlegislative rules and policy pronouncements on 
administrative judges becomes complicated. An administrative judge 
should not apply a nonlegislative rule if its application would be 
unfair. Hence, a judge may not be technically bound by an agency 
policy pronouncement that is not made pursuant to a delegated 
authority-meaning they may be bound only to legislative rules. 118 
One example involved a seventeen-year-old woman with brain 
damage who was able to remain at home with extensive nursing help. 
The agency sought to downgrade the level of home nursing help, 
relying on a North Carolina Medicaid manual. The administrative 
judge , reviewing the change in status, found that the manual's list of 
criteria for justifying the enhanced service was not exhaustive, and 
ruled for the claimant. 119 Logically the Ruiz doctrine begins at the 
procedural rules that limit otherwise discretionary actions."); Lake Mohave Boat 
Owners v. Nat'l Park Service, 138 F.3d 759,763 (9th Cir. 1998). 
114. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
115. /d. at 232. 
116. E.g., /d. at 233-35; United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 
1161, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that a litigant could not rely on a regulation 
because it was not intended to be binding but to act as guidance); Warder v. 
Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 82 (lst Cir. 1998). 
117. Morton, 415 U.S. at 233-35. 
118. See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: 
Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803 (2001) 
(arguing generally that "publication rules," though lacking the force of law, are 
important to the system, and so judges should not discourage reliance upon them). 
119. Roberts v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 02 DHR 1138, 2003 WL 
84 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-1 
hearing-level in order to facilitate the exercise of individual 
discretion in decisionmaking. 
However, it is the extent of the judge's discretion that presents the 
real question. For years, courts have been bound by "Skidmore 
deference" when reviewing the application of nonlegislative rules. 120 
This dictates that a court, while not bound to the rule, may find that 
the nonlegislative rule has the "power to persuade." 121 Under Ruiz, if 
the agency has a duty not to inflexibly apply a nonlegislative rule, 
then perhaps administrative judges are justified in following a 
nonlegislative rule only to the extent they find the rule persuasive. 
While they are not authorized to change nonlegislative rules, they 
may adjust policy pronouncements under certain circumstances. 
Moreover, rules rarely answer all the questions raised in an 
adjudication, and administrative judges often have no choice but to 
engage in interpretation of various types of policy pronouncements-
both legislative and nonlegislative. The agency has considerable 
interpretive discretion, and it is well-established that an agency has 
broad authority to interpret its own rules. 122 Since the agency is 
21638171 (N.C.O.A.H. Apr. 25, 2003). 
120. The classic statement: 
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of 
. the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the 
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants 
may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment 
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in 
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give 
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control. 
Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The Court has consistently referred 
to this formulation. E.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-38 (2001) 
(finding that an agency's ruling may be merely persuasive); Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (refusing to apply the EEOC guidelines). 
121. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
122. The classic authority for this proposition is Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945) (stating that "[s]ince this involves an 
interpretation of an administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to the 
administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in 
doubt"), but the most cited case is Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 16 (1965) (dealing 
with agency interpretations in general). The Supreme Court continually reaffirms 
this long-standing approach. E.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 
(2000) ("[A)n agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to 
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conceded such broad authority to interpret rules and policy 
pronouncements, and even to engage in justified deviation, it follows 
that the agency's administrative judges may also do so-but 
carefully. 123 Like superior precedent, judges might interpret rules in 
deference."); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 356 (2000); Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 463 (1997); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 
(1993); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112 (1992); Martin v. Occupational 
Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991). 
Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or 
changing circumstances calls upon the agency's unique expertise 
and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power 
authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of 
the agency's delegated lawmaking powers. 
/d. In Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415 (1988), the court stated: 
[W]hen it is the Secretary's regulation that we are construing, 
and when there is no claim in this Court that the regulation 
violates any constitutional or statutory mandate, we are properly 
hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for the Secretary's 
unless that alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's 
plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at 
the time of the regulation's promulgation. 
/d. at 430; see also Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 
484 U.S. 135, 159 (1987). The lower courts also often express this doctrine. E.g., 
Wells Fargo Bank of Texas NA v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(stating that "where . . . the regulation is ambiguous as to the precise issue in 
contest, an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless it is 
clearly erroneous"); Clark Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 314 
F.3d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Under the APA, an agency's interpretation of a 
regulation must be given controlling weight unless it is 'plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation."') (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 
U.S. 504, 512 (1994)). But see Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588 ("Auer deference is 
warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous .... To defer to 
the agency's position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting 
a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation."); Moore v. Hannon Food Serv., 
Inc., 317 F.3d 489, 494-96 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding the requirement that the rule be 
ambiguous was shared among the circuits, the court refused to give deference to the 
agency's interpretation of clear language). 
123. Interpretation may not constitute amendment or repeal, so even the agency 
head may not use interpretation in an adjudication because a rule must be amended 
or repealed by the same procedure with which it was promulgated. 1 KOCH, supra 
note 2, § 4.60[2]. If the need for amendment is identified in adjudication, or if the 
interpretation cannot make the necessary adjustment without constituting an 
amendment, then the adjudicators must commend the issue to the policymaking 
processes of the agency. 
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order to develop agency policy. 124 Policy change must percolate up 
through the process, and hence each level has a role in sharpening the 
rule through interpretation. A judge's interpretation provides 
experience, which the rule and its policy will use to develop. Judges' 
interpretations additionally provide perspective on the policy's 
application, giving the agency "samples" for use in evolving future 
policy. Adjustments within the terms of the rule neither challenge the 
agency's authority nor unduly upset stability and equality. While 
judges may pay close attention to the language and clear meaning of a 
rule, a potential policymaking contribution exists when judges look 
behind the rule to conclude that strict application of the rule would 
not further its purpose in the individual case before them. That is, 
rather than literal strategies of interpretation, the judge may attempt 
to apply the rule as the agency would interpret the rule in that 
particular context. 
However, in both interpretation and application, a judge should 
be mindful of the effect policy pronouncements have on the public. 
Regardless of the policy pronouncement's formal effect, a member of 
the public to which the policy applies would be ill-advised to ignore 
it; hence the pronouncement creates a variety of agency law. 125 The 
public relies on all forms of policy expression (if they recognize any 
difference), hence administrative judges should feel some pressure to 
follow a pronouncement's language. Where a person relies on a rule, 
a judge should follow the rule because a court will hold the agency to 
the rule. Even where an individual did not detrimentally rely on the 
rule, the administrative judge should understand that the general 
public looked to the rule for guidance. For a judge to take undue 
liberties with the language of policy statements, regardless of a 
particular individual's detriment in relying on the rule, seemingly 
disadvantages those covered by the particular administrative program. 
124. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995) (stating that 
"[t]he AP A does not require that all the specific applications of a rule evolve by 
further, more precise rules rather than by adjudication"). 
125. Anthony has done the most to develop this argument. Recently, he 
addressed circumstances under which government guidance documents, advisories, 
opinion letters, bulletins, inspection manuals, and press releases effectively bind 
persons outside the agency in a practical, as opposed to legal, sense. Robert A. 
Anthony, Three Settings in Which Nonlegislative Rules Should Not Bind, 53 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1313 (2001). 
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Thus, considerations of fairness counsel an administrative judge 
generally to give effect to both nonlegislative and legislative rules. 
Like superior precedent, affording judges policy discretion 
regarding agency rules demands strong agency review to reassert the 
value of consistency, the authority of the agency over policy, and any 
process values compromised by straying from the rule as 
promulgated. A system balancing flexibility and stability requires the 
placement of ultimate authority in the agency. Each individual 
administrative program may strike the appropriate balance 
differently, determining the appropriate attitude for the agency's 
judges to take towards agency rules and policy pronouncements. 
Policymaking should be seen as a coordinated effort in which the 
judge's individual decisions contribute to policy development rather 
than an adversarial process in which the judge struggles against the 
agency's policymaking efforts. 
To further this cooperative effort, an agency may consider taking 
advantage of judges' experiences and perspectives when developing 
agency rules. While ethical rules seemingly prohibit such 
participation, the commentary to the Judicial Code observes that "a 
judge is in a unique position to contribute to the improvement of the 
law, the legal system, and the administration of justice . . . . To the 
h . . . d . d d ,126 extent t at time permits, a JU ge 1s encourage to o so . . . . 
Judicial participation in administrative policymaking offers the same 
benefits discussed in the Code, indeed administrative judges have 
even more to contribute as active participants in administrative 
policymaking. However, the canon contains the hortatory phrase 
"subject to the requirements of this Code." 127 The commentary notes, 
"This phrase is included to remind judges that the use of permissive 
language in various Sections of the Code does not relieve a judge 
from the other requirements of the Code that apply to the specific 
conduct." 128 
Attention to structuring judicial participation in agency 
policymaking is important to tapping this valuable resource and 
assuring that it falls within the appropriate range of judicial-type 
126. ABA CODE, supra note 96, at Canon 4B, cmt. [1]. 
127. !d. at Canon 4B. 
128. /d. at cmt. [2]. 
88 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-1 
activities. For example, an agency may encourage judges to identify 
troublesome issues and recommendations as to possible 
resolutions. 129 Agencies with large numbers of administrative judges 
(or in independent corps systems described below), might create an 
advisory committee of judges. 130 As long as these contributions are 
open and made publicly available, they are not objectionable. In 
short, administrative adjudicators can provide a valuable resource to 
agencies formulating rules and policy. 
ill. APPROPRIATE CONSIDERATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUDGE POLICY ANALYSIS 
Recognizing and advocating a role for administrative judges in 
administrative policymaking requires a careful inquiry into the norms 
for their policy judgments. Administrative judges are, and should be, 
active participants in the administrative policymaking function. 
However, if administrative judges are delegated this responsibility, 
and freed from the mere application of the agency's policy 
129. In order to take advantage of the expertise of judges in those systems, the 
French have regularized the submission by the courts of recommendations for 
legislation. One scholar observed: 
"[T]he Court of Cassation [the highest general law court] was 
very well placed to assess and comment upon the shortcomings of 
laws it applies on a day-to-day basis, notably spotting conflicting 
or outdated texts, and texts whose strict application may lead to 
injustice. The judiciary ... being involved in the shaping of the 
law through its case law, could only have a positive influence on 
the process of law reform if someone were to take the trouble to 
listen to what it had to say. In fact ... the best way to reform the 
law in practical terms was through the joint efforts of judges and 
legislators acting in partnership, something ... that the annual 
report of the Court was trying to achieve." 
EVA STEINER, FRENCH LEGAL METHOD 115-16 (2002). 
130. The conventional judiciary is a regular participant in the legislative 
process. Moreover, the Supreme Court in the classic separation of powers case, 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1988), seemed to accept the employment 
of judges in rulemaking. The Court held that neither the Commission's placement in 
the judiciary or the requirement that some federal judges serve as commissioners 
violated separation of powers. !d. at 412. Surely, if these members of the judiciary 
may participate in, and indeed form the heart of, a rulemaking agency, there can be 
neither legal impediment nor ethical objection to the administrative judiciary doing 
likewise. 
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expression, they must be conscious of the forces likely to operate on 
their policy choices. 
Administrative judges facing a policy issue must be consciously 
aware of the perceptual influences likely to affect their decisions. 
Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich applied the findings of one study, 
which identified certain honest "cognitive" distortions, to measure 
the impact of cognitive biases on judicial judgment. 131 They noted: 
"Psychologists have learned that human beings rely on . mental 
shortcuts, which psychologists often refer to as 'heuristics,' to make 
complex decisions. Reliance on these heuristics facilitates good 
judgment most of the time, but it can also produce systematic errors 
in judgment."132 These commentators demonstrate that judges are 
vulnerable to cognitive illusions generated by heuristics. 133 For 
example, measuring the effect of "framing," the categorization of 
decisions according to salient reference points, they found that 
framing "influenced the development of legal doctrine."134 Along 
with the other heuristics, one would expect this heuristic could have 
some effect-even a considerable effect-on policy judgments by 
administrative adjudicators. The commentators' suggested remedies 
131. Chris Guthrie eta!., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 
825 (2001). 
132. /d. at 780. But see Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social 
Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 486, 
509 ( 2002) (arguing that appellate courts, unlike trial courts and many 
administrative adjudicators, have self-correcting mechanisms for these errors). 
Social psychology research has demonstrated that a conscious, rational mental 
process does not always lead to a better decision. See generally SUSAN FISKE & 
SHELLY TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNffiON 399-402 (2d ed. 1991). One recent study is 
particularly interesting. See Timothy Wilson & Jonathan Schooler, Thinking Too 
Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preference & Decisions, 60 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 181 (1991). The researchers evaluated certain 
types of choices in terms of the subjects' satisfaction and found that "rational" 
decisionmaking produced inferior choices in terms of the subjective preferences of 
those subjects. /d. at 190. One reported study, evaluating student course selection, 
suggested that some choices might be objectively inferior as well. That study found 
that the "rational" choices were inferior to the "intuitive" choices when measured 
against the opinions of the faculty and the recommendations of students who had 
previously taken the course. /d. 
133. Guthrie et a!., supra note 131, at 782. 
134. /d. at 798. 
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thus become particularly relevant. They advise: "Only if increased 
attention and greater deliberation enable judges to abandon the 
heuristics that they are otherwise inclined to rely upon can they avoid 
the illusions of judgment that these heuristics produce."135 This 
supports the conclusion that the best cure for these "errors," perhaps 
particularly in policy judgments, is conscious attention to these 
potential decisionmaking flaws. 136 
Experience and anecdotal evidence suggest that judges of a11 
vanettes are not immune from personal motivations. As 
policymakers, administrative judges must also confront the danger of 
being ruled by their individual biases. Policy preferences in general 
have long been accepted, and to some extent encouraged, in both 
conventional and administrative adjudicators. 137 While administrative 
judges may demonstrate and express such biases, the system cannot 
allow these personal biases to rule administrative policy. 
Consequently, if administrative judges are to have a policymaking 
role, they must be careful to examine the motivations behind their 
policy choices. Additionally, the administrative review authority 
should recognize these biases and assure they are consistent with the 
135. /d. at 784. They investigate anchoring (making estimates based on 
irrelevant starting points), framing (treating economically equivalent gains and 
losses differently), hindsight bias (perceiving past events to have been more 
predictable than they actually were), the representativeness heuristic (ignoring 
important background statistical information in favor of individuating information), 
and egocentric biases (overestimating one's own abilities). /d. 
136. /d. at 819. 
137. For example, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive 
Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 554 
(2002), noting: 
A key lesson of cognitive psychology is that even people 
with good motives tend to make bad choices in certain, 
predictable circumstances. Identifying those circumstances is at 
least as significant to diagnosing public policy failures as is 
focusing on the motives of key regulatory actors. 
Id. But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for 
Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1165, 1168 (2003) (noting that restructuring 
decisions to avoid misleading heuristics means that "[t]his cognitive cost, like a 
transaction cost, might support adopting a particular legal rule constraining 
individual choice if the cost is high enough or an inexpensive reform reduces the 
cognitive cost in some way"). 
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administrative program. 138 
Administrative judges should also be conscious of the way life 
experiences affect their judgment.139 For example, Sisk, Heise, and 
Morriss measured the proposition "that social background of personal 
attributes of judges shape personal and policy values that directly 
influence judicial decisions." 140 The study generally agreed with 
others that sociological background characteristics are not very 
helpful in understanding judging. 141 However, the study found that 
certain nonobjective factors affected judicial decisionmaking. 142 They 
reported that "our study found nearly every prior employment 
variable of these judges, with the exceptions of law professor and 
political experience (and perhaps prosecutorial experience), to be 
significant in some manner." 143 
138. Judge Hardwicke, the dean of panel judges, summarized: 
It would be highly improper for an administrative judge to 
color any decision with the ALJ's personal outlook or subjective 
viewpoint. However, intuition and instinct are reasonable, even 
necessary, for the ALJ insofar as they relate to the overarching 
mission of the agency on the one hand, and to requisite 
uncompromising fairness and impartiality for the citizen on the 
other. 
Hardwicke, supra note 90, at 439. 
139. It is unclear how susceptible judges, in general, are to more personal 
motivations because studies, legal and behavioral, persist in seeing judges as 
otherworldly. Even legal realists, who challenge the idea that doctrines rule judges, 
believe that they are ruled by individual equity and sincere policy preferences rather 
than general principles. Even those who view judges as just another set of 
maximizers perceive that they maximize their view of social welfare, not-as the 
rest of us-their personal advantages. Schauer observed: "In sharing this common 
ground of belief that what really matters to judges are their sincere policy 
preferences ... [investigators] tend to ignore or downplay the possibility that 
judges, no less than legislators and bureaucrats, have strong career-based self-
interests that often inform or dominate their policy preferences." Schauer, 
Incentives, supra note 4, at 620. He suggests that we consider the possibility that 
judges are more driven by rational self-interest than we often concede. !d. at 620-
21. 
140. Sisk et al., supra note 42, at 1385. 
141. !d. at 1387. 
142. !d. at 1470. 
143. /d. Administrative judges might actually be less susceptible to their 
experience; however, it might be significant, for example, that prior prosecutorial 
experience does not make a difference since that is comparable to prior agency staff 
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Career aspirations can also affect policy judgments. The study 
confirmed earlier research indicating that advancement affects judges. 
144 However, career considerations may be less influential with 
administrative judges than with conventional judges. Administrative 
judges tend to be at the end of a career path, thus career motives may 
be less compelling. Still, adopting suggestions for countering these 
motivations may be helpful: "At the same time, we have discovered 
that this variable does not operate in isolation but evolves with the 
circumstances of the litigation and the theoretical underpinnings of 
the case."145 In other words, the system and the judges can correct the 
motivation if they are sensitized to it. 
Of course, less innocent motivations can also affect adjudicators' 
policy initiatives. One study supports the conclusion that judges 
pursue policy preference strategies that are sensitive to political 
actors. 146 In a separate empirical study of EPA cases, Jordan 
concluded: 
I would not characterize these results as 
demonstrative strategic ideological voting. To the 
contrary, as Judge Wald has argued, they appear to 
reflect differences in . . . "personalit[ies] and life 
experiences that lead the judge to vote Democratic or 
Republican" in the first place, rather than adherence to 
a party or personal ideological agenda. 147 
experience. 
144. !d. at 1493 ("[W]e and Cohen have both confirmed that promotion 
potential is a factor in understanding lower federal court behavior.") (citing Mark 
Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior of What's 'Unconstitutional' About the 
Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183 (1991 )). 
145. Sisk et al., supra note 42, at 1493. 
146. A study has shown that the Supreme Court is conscious of political actors 
in setting its agenda. See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, & Jennifer Nicoll Victor, 
Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States Supreme Court: An Empirical 
Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 403 (2002) ("Our analysis of the data leads 
us to conclude that the justices do indeed consider the preferences and likely 
responses of other political actors in deciding whether to grant certiorari."). 
147. William Jordan III, Judges, Ideology, and Policy in the Administrative 
State: Lessons from a Decade of Hard Look Remands of EPA Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. 
REv. 45, 99 (2001) (quoting Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as 
Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review and Other Great 
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While this is encouraging in terms of partnership, it suggests a 
challenge to objectivity that may create an inappropriate motivation 
for policy disagreements with the agency. In the end, it is the agency 
that is to make these types of policy judgments.148 A system 
envisioning a policy role for administrative judges must control for 
the impact of personal policy biases. 149 
Administrative judges, more so than their conventional 
counterparts, may also be influenced by public opinion as they 
contemplate policy moves. Administrative officials cannot ignore the 
community's views in general, but the extent to which they should 
allow their perception of public opinion to drive their policy 
initiatives is complex. At first glance, the incorporation of public-
regarding factors might be applauded. However, administrative 
judges' primary concern should be the resolution of individual 
disputes. Therefore, public opinion is arguably inappropriate at this 
adjudicative stage. Moreover, if judges are expected to incorporate 
public wishes into decisions, on what basis should judges determine 
the best interests of the public? This raises the age-old conflict faced 
by officials in a democratic society: Should they decide what is 
"best," or should they attempt to decide what the public wants? An 
expert theory of the administrative process suggests that adjudicators 
should be insulated from these factors, but if the adjudication is, at a 
base level, developing policy, then the process cannot remain 
insensitive to the public's views. However, administrative judges 
might not be the proper adjudicators to weigh public opinion since 
discerning public opinion is arguably outside the realm of their 
function and expertise. Administrative judges should be sensitive to 
the public regarding certain factors yet still leave public opinion to 
the "political" elements of the administrative process. 
All people, including judges, respond to the group of which they 
are a member. 150 Judge Posner observed: 
Books, 100 HARV. L. REv. 887, 891 (1987)). 
148. Moreover, administrative judges do not have the protections of members 
of the conventional federal judiciary-certainly not the constitutional protection-
and might face more deep-rooted incentives. 
149. See supra note 139. 
150. See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 85, at 161 (stating that "the behavior 
of judges is primarily governed by internally generated norms that can be altogether 
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[E]very judge, trial and appellate, is a member of a 
community of judges-the predecessors and 
successors of the current judges, as well as the current 
judges themselves. Judicial decision making is 
collective in a profound sense, and the importance of 
institutional values in such a setting should be self-
evident.151 
25-1 
Revesz's studies observed the impact of group politics in the D.C. 
Circuit. 152 Chief Judge Edwards vituperatively challenged these 
studies, but Edwards appears to accept the effects a judicial 
community has on decisions. 153 Revesz found, in essence, a tendency 
towards cooperative behavior within the circuit and the individual 
panels. Cross and Tiller confirmed this behavior within the federal 
circuits and panels and asserted that it is not ideology but the 
dynamics of cooperation that influences judicial behavior. 154 Whether 
the behavior in the D.C. Circuit or others is crassly partisan or even 
ideological is irrelevant to the inquiry. Notable is that a community of 
judges can be expected to act cooperatively, and hence judicial 
decisions might be distorted by collective influences, perhaps termed 
internal politics or judicial culture. Individual cases should not be 
affected by this cultural ethos. Administrative adjudicative regimes 
different from the officially stated organizational rules"). 
151. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 258 
(1985); see also Lynn Stout, Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 1605, 1612 (2002) (noting hundreds of studies showing that "[a]s a rule of 
thumb, experimenters have found that cooperation rates in social dilemmas average 
about fifty percent"). Three factors determine socially conscious behavior: a 
tendency to do what one is told by an authority figure, a sense of membership in a 
common group, and a degree of anticipation that one's colleagues will cooperate. 
/d. at 1615-16. 
152. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, supra note 5; Revesz, Ideology, supra 
note 5; see also Revesz, Litigation and Settlement, supra note 5. 
153. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making in the D.C. Circuit, 
84 VA. L. REv. 1335 (1998); Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of 
Numbers (and Unsupported Claims of Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 723 
(2002). 
154. Cross & Tiller, supra note 5, at 2174. But see Richard J. Pierce Jr., Two 
Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia 
Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 303-
07 (explaining decisions by individual policy preferences and politics). 
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create a variety of communities, from agencies with only a few 
judges to the Social Security Administration with some 1100 judges, 
to the state central panels analyzed below. The best solution, in the 
end, is conscious attention to the dangers. 155 
Individual or collective motivations can be mitigated by a natural 
tendency of the judiciary in favor of impartiality and integrity. 156 The 
"rational maximizer" perception of judges would predict behavior in 
favor of enhancing individual policy objectives and prestige. 
However, public choice admits that this model lacks predictive power 
regarding judicial behavior, though support for this behavior is found 
in other public officials. 157 Judges as policymakers cannot be 
understood simply as rational maximizers in the public choice model. 
Hirschman observed: 
A court, properly briefed, can-and should-
ascertain and move in the direction of the public 
interest. ... The courts will not always be right. As 
Thomas Kuhn points out, knowledge moves forward 
on wheels of necessary hypotheses. But unlike the 
radical agnosticism of the pure public choice school, it 
is at least a worthy enterprise. 158 
Judges will do their jobs fairly and faithfully if they are esteemed 
155. Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 85, at 169-70 ("Social sanctions in a 
closely knit group (such as judges] whose members repeatedly interact are likely to 
be highly effective. If these informal nonlegal sanctions work effectively, an 
expensive, formal enforcement system may be unnecessary."). 
156. Stout demonstrated that judges will try to do the "right thing." Stout, 
supra note 151, at 1612. 
157. See, e.g., Richard Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The 
Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1993) ("The 
economic analyst has a model of how criminals and contract parties, injurers and 
accident victims, parents and spouses--even legislators, and executive officials 
such as prosecutors-act, but falters when asked to produce a model of how judges 
act."); Edward Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1399 (1996) ("[N]o stable 
[public choice] theory has emerged to explain the behavior of judges .... "). 
158. Linda Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of 
Administrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 646, 704 (1998) (citation omitted). 
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for doing so. 159 This hankering after esteem affects highly visible 
adjudicators in an interesting way: they tend to want to impress 
academics and journalists. 160 Lower courts are less visible, and hence 
seek esteem from other judges and practitioners. 161 Thus, 
administrative judges can be expected to perform their duties well if 
their contributions, including their policy roles, are valued by the 
agency and others. 162 Agencies at odds with judges over proper policy 
roles likely affect the judges' performances not only in policymaking 
but also in other duties. Policy innovations and adjustments give 
judges a chance to shine and offer an opportunity for judges to 
perform at their best. Epstein observed that judges are likely to 
attempt to increase their influence and prestige but are forced to do so 
through excellent decisions. 163 
In general, the pitfalls above do not argue against policy 
participation by administrative judges. Rather, judges should be 
conscious of potential distortions and should be trained to deal with 
them. 164 Both remedies are impeded by ignoring the policymaking 
role of judges. Careful agency review is necessary to mitigate 
individual influences in order to develop a unified and objective 
policy. Policy biases expressed in administrative policy should be 
those of the agency head who has been delegated that function, and 
who will ultimately be held accountable. Moreover, consistency and 
equal treatment within a program requires the unifying influence of 
the agency over administrative judges. Judges perform a formative 
159. Schauer, Incentives, supra note 4, at 573. 
160. /d. at 628. 
161. /d. at 629-31. 
162. But see Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and 
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 
1051, I 052 (1995) (indicating that while "craft" is an important limitation on 
conventional judges because they care about the perception of their competence, 
administrative law doctrines are more open-ended so that administrative judges 
have more discretion, and hence "craft" is less of a limitation on their ideological 
biases). 
163. Richard Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations 
of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REv. 827, 838 (1990). The structure of the 
judiciary successfully counteracts certain risks. /d. at 831-32. 
164. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 137, at 593 ("Probably the key 
insight of the cognitive psychological model is that the policymaking process 
should be designed to exploit the distinctive strengths, and compensate for the 
distinctive weaknesses, of experts and laypersons."). 
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role in the dynamics of policymaking, consequently the system 
should channel their participation in order to assure integrity in the 
overall policymaking endeavor. 
IV. BUILDING A RECORD FOR POLICYMAKING 
As contributors to the administrative policymaking enterprise, 
administrative judges offer original solutions balancing equal 
treatment and consistency against individualizing and advancing 
administrative policy. Policy evolution is facilitated by administrative 
judges in an equally significant way by developing the record 
necessary for consideration of policy issues. Administrative judges 
should be aware of their responsibility, and the system should provide 
more opportunities for judges to fulfill this responsibility. Therefore, 
considering the development of the policymaking record in 
adjudication is particularly relevant. 
A An Active Role for Administrative Judges in 
Building a Policymaking Record 
The record provides the policy analysis throughout the 
adjudicative machinery with the information needed to develop 
policy. Policy in adjudication requires that the facts compiled in the 
hearing-level record adequately support policy determinations and the 
justification for those decisions. In the end, the administrative judges 
must be responsible for the adequacy of the record for this purpose. 
Fortunately, administrative law permits administrative adjudicators to 
actively participate in the development of the record. 165 
Adjudication decides individual rights or duties, consequently it 
focuses on facts related to the specific dispute, "adjudicative facts," 
and its procedures are designed to serve this purpose. 166 
165. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995) ("ALJs have a duty to 
develop a full and fair record in social security cases."); Yanopoulos v. Dep't of the 
Navy, 796 F.2d 468, 471 (Fed. Cir. 1986). But see Jeffrey Wolfe & Lisa Proszek, 
Interaction Dynamics in Federal Administrative Decision Making: The Role of the 
Inquisitorial Judge and the Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293, 298-302 
(1997). 
166. Adjudicative facts are "facts concerning immediate parties"-
distinguished from policy-related facts or "legislative facts," discussed below. 
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Policymaking requires the development of more general or societal 
facts, called "legislative facts." 167 An agency needs legislative facts to 
support and justify its policy conclusions. Obviously, the power to 
identify and find those facts constitutes a considerable part of the 
power to make policy. But, in adjudication, even some specific facts 
may be relevant to policy issues. Woolhander' s observation is 
particularly important for our purposes: "The line between 
adjudicative and legislative facts is indistinct, however, because 
decisionmakers use even the most particularized facts to make legal 
rules." 168 In short, the administrative adjudicative record must include 
facts, of whatever category, necessary to resolve policy issues as well 
as resolve the individual dispute. 
Flexible application of the traditional evidentiary rules permitted 
in many administrative adjudicative settings might go some distance 
to facilitate a policymaking record. Administrative adjudications are 
governed by an array of evidentiary rules, most leaving the 
administrative judge with considerable discretion. 169 Evidence is 
admitted in administrative proceedings for "what it is worth." 
Evidence clearly relevant to a policy question, even if tangential to 
the specific dispute, might then be admitted as relevant to the general 
resolution of the controversy. 170 
Kenneth Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative 
Process, 55 HARV. L. REv. 364, 402 (1942) Kenneth Davis, later to become a 
major administrative law scholar, distinguished adjudicative facts from legislative 
facts for determining the appropriateness of judicial notice. /d. The distinction is 
also important to the rules regarding judicial notice. See FED. R. EVID. 20 l advisory 
committee's note [hereinafter EVIDENCE RULEs]. 
167. The person who invented the distinction defined such facts: "When a 
court or an agency develops law or policy, it is acting legislatively .... [T]he facts 
which inform the tribunal's legislative judgment may be called legislative facts." 2 
KENNETH DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 283 (1960). Legislative facts are 
contrasted from adjudicative facts and the facts necessary to resolve the relevant 
individual dispute. 
168. Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 
41 VAND.L.REv.lll, 114(1988). 
169. See Richard Pierce, Use of Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency 
Adjudications, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. l, 7 (1987). 
170. Often, information supporting policy is technically hearsay, or has the feel 
of hearsay, and administrative law allows it. For example, often such information 
takes the form of reports and published studies. General admissibility of hearsay 
has been particularly accepted. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971 ). 
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Unfortunately, the administrative hearing, like the trial, is 
controlled by the litigants. The record depends on the quality, energy, 
and-more significantly-the focus of the lawyers. Policy issues 
usually appear peripheral and are rarely directly relevant to the 
concerns of the individual litigant. The parties-even the agency 
staff-are not motivated to introduce those facts because they may 
not be necessary to resolve the particular dispute. Indeed, the parties 
may have some incentive to divert attention from these facts. At the 
hearing stage, only the administrative judge will likely feel some need 
for a record adequate to resolve pivotal policy issues of a broader 
nature. Yet, in the common-law system, judges have virtually no 
affirmative duty to develop the facts. 171 The judge's role, whether a 
conventional or administrative judge, is to assure the "quality" of that 
information by applying certain preordained and traditional rules of 
evidence. 
The common-law tradition inhibits a more active fact-gathering 
role for judges. Yet, somewhat inconsistently, the tradition expects 
judges to evolve the law. This contradiction is even more pronounced 
in the administrative adjudicative context. The system cannot excuse 
administrative judges from assuring an adequate record on facts 
relevant to policy issues they or the agency might face. 172 Agencies 
must insist that judges perform this role because policy judgments 
must be supported in a variety of arenas-including judicial review. 
Traditionally, policy decisions were subject to review under an abuse 
of discretion or arbitrariness standard. 173 Though limited scrutiny, 
But see Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405-06 (3d Cir. 2003) (relying on 
unreliable hearsay violates procedural due process). 
171. ABA CODE, supra note 96, at Canon 3(B)[7] ("A judge must not 
independently investigate facts in a case and must consider only the evidence 
presented."). 
172. Administrative law envisions an active role for administrative judges in 
assuring the adequate development of specific or adjudicative facts as well. 2 
KOCH, supra note 2, § 5.25[2]. It creates a substantial tension between this duty and 
the common-law tradition of passive judging. However, this piece focuses on 
perhaps the more compelling conceptual problem of providing an adequate record 
for policymaking in adjudication within the common-law tradition. 
173. E.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Fed. Labor Relations 
Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 98 n.8 ( 1983). 
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these word formulas often result in a test of whether the agency 
considered all possibilities and had adequate support for its policy 
conclusions. 174 Therefore, the administrative judge must assure an 
adequate record exists for policymaking, especially when the litigants 
are not likely to do so. 
Administrative judges must assure that the record contains the 
necessary technical information. Policy resolution may depend on 
expertise in a number of nonlegal disciplines. Administrative law 
grants considerable deference to the agency's expert judgment and 
the judges must be empowered to actively build this aspect of the 
record. 175 Administrative judges have considerable discretion to 
admit expert evidence. 176 The administrative judge may rely on an 
agency expert, 177 but administrative judges rarely have independent 
authority to seek other expert advice or even to call their own 
experts. 178 While party control of the record is acceptable for 
[A]n agency acting within its authority to make policy 
choices consistent with the congressional mandate should receive 
considerable deference from courts, provided, of course, that its 
actions conform to applicable procedural requirements and are 
not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise 
in accordance with law." 
/d.; Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357, 1371 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding the 
agency's policy was not arbitrary). 
174. E.g., City of Dallas, Tex. v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 355 (5th Cir. 1999) 
("[W]e affirm the Commission's policy choice if it considered competing 
arguments and articulated a reasonable basis for its conclusions."). 
175. Marsh v. Ore. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) ("Because 
analysis of the relevant documents 'requires a high level of technical expertise,' we 
must defer to 'the informed discretion of the responsible federal agency."') (quoting 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. 
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) ("Administrative agencies are simply better 
suited than courts to engage in such [an expert] process."). 
176. EVIDENCE RULES, supra note 166, at Rule 702. This rule requires only 
that the evidence proffered be reliable and relevant, and hence even a court need 
not assure that the expert's views are generally accepted. Daubert v. Merrel Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). 
177. Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 951 F.2d 669,678 (5th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 823 (1992). 
178. Under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, judges may seek legal advice 
only. ABA CODE, supra note 96, at Canon 3(B). JEFFREY SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT AND ETHICS 173 (2000) ("While judges may, under certain 
circumstances, obtain advice concerning the law from disinterested experts, the 
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adjudicative issues, the policymaking function of adjudication would 
be greatly enhanced if administrative judges could actively seek 
experts related to the issues. If the expert's testimony is likely to be 
important to the particular adjudication, the judge could present the 
expert for examination by the parties. However, if the expert's advice 
goes to general policy issues, the advice would enter the record. 179 
A procedure is needed which would allow a judge to complete the 
policymaking aspect of the adjudicative record without offending 
traditional principles to the point of invalidating the adjudication. 180 
"Official" or "administrative" notice is one traditional method for 
empowering a judge to affirmatively build the policymaking record. 
Conceptually, official notice is the same as judicial notice. It enters 
facts into the record without the need for formal "proof." Federal 
Rule of Evidence 201 distinguishes between adjudicative facts and 
legislative facts, and focuses on the process for introducing certain 
categories of adjudicative facts. After some opportunity for comment, 
some adjudicative facts may be noticed without proof. The Federal 
Rules provide no procedures for admitting legislative facts. The 
commentators asserted that "the judge is unrestricted in his 
exception does not extend to experts in other areas."). In the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct, access is intentionally narrowed to "legal" experts, which as 
discussed below, if read generously, might be valuable in policy judgments. 
Consultation with other types of experts is prohibited for members of the judiciary, 
but administrative law might take a different view./d. § 5.07. 
179. The administrative process might learn from the civil-law system in which 
the judges consult the experts. CATHERINE ELLIOTI & CATHERINE VERNON, 
FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 129 (2000) (''The judge's powers concerning oral evidence 
are very wide .... The French judge has even greater powers in connection with 
expert evidence, as the normal practice is for a single neutral expert appointed by 
the court. Parties do not normally appoint their own experts."); ANDREW WEST ET 
AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 297 (1998) ("It is for the judge to choose the 
expert .... "). However, the ABA CODE, supra note 96, specifically rejects this 
alternative. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 178, at 172 ("Unlike the European system, 
in which judges have the primary responsibility for the development of litigative 
facts, American judges are generally permitted only to consider the evidence and 
testimony that is produced by counsel."). 
180. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKMAN, RISK REGULATION AT 
RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC BALANCE 158-64 (2003) (explaining various 
adjudicative procedures used by agencies to adjust the scope of regulation, 
including waivers, deadline extensions, and exceptions). 
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investigation and conclusion [regarding legislative facts, and] the 
parties do not more than to assist; they control no part of the 
process." 181 The finder of fact with unbridled discretion regarding the 
admission of legislative facts possesses "a dangerous freedom." 182 
The best practice in administrative adjudications, regardless of the 
practice in courts, is to offer some opportunity for comment. This was 
recently confirmed by the Supreme Court: "[l]t is well established 
that, as long as a party has an opportunity to respond, an 
administrative agency may take official notice of such 'legislative 
facts' within its special knowledge, and is not confined to the 
evidence in the record in reaching its expert judgment."183 Official 
notice offers the administrative judge a well-established device for 
obtaining the range of information necessary to build the policy-
related part of the record. Consequently, judges should use it 
creatively and more often. 
In addition, the administrative judge might consider whether 
options beyond those provided by the litigants are necessary for a full 
airing of the policy issue. Liberal intervention might be one 
established method allowing a judge to expand contributions to the 
record. Intervention allows the judge to permit other interested 
persons to raise, support, and discuss policy issues. Liberal 
intervention in administrative proceedings allows participation that is 
tangential to the specific dispute. 184 Over the years, administrative 
law has developed a sliding scale of intervention in which interested 
persons might participate in various forms, ranging from full party 
status to filing documents on a specific issue. 185 Administrative 
181. EVIDENCE RULES, supra note 166, Rule 20l(a) advisory committee's note 
(quoting Henry Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REv. 269, 270-71 (1994), 
although the quote referred to "domestic law"). 
182. Peggy C. Davis, There is a Book Out . . . . An Analysis of Judicial 
Absorption of Legislative Facts, !00 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1541 (1987); see also 
Woolhandler, supra note 168. 
183. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 298 (2000) (emphasis added) 
(accepting the city council's findings regarding the harmful effect of nude dancing 
in a particular area of the city). 
184. AP A, supra note 11, at § 555(b) ("So far as the orderly conduct of public 
business permits, an interested person may appear before an agancy or its 
responsible employees for presentation, adjustment, or determination of an issue, 
request, or controversy .... "). 
185. Brice Claggett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rulemaking: Some 
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judges might be particularly sensitive to interveners who will 
contribute to the agency's, as well as their own, policy decisions. 
Unfortunately, interested persons are unlikely to know about the 
consideration of policy issues or have the wherewithal to participate 
in their resolution, especially in mass justice programs. Thus, the 
administrative judge must be the key person. The judges must assure 
that key opinions are found in the record to support their policy 
judgments, and ultimately those of the agency. However, permitting a 
judge to actually solicit intervention to obtain wide policy views 
challenges our adjudicative traditions. However, within bounds, 
judges should be allowed to do so-relying on Wyman-Gordon for 
support. 186 Yet where the need strays too far beyond the focus of the 
individual dispute, the better approach may be to note the need and 
leave the job of considering how to incorporate broader participation 
to the agency. The agency may choose to exercise its rulemaking 
authority, an option unavailable to the judge. 
Administrative judges have the authority to gather legislative 
facts and may have a duty to seek these facts when a policy issue is 
perceived. But, do administrative judges possess the authority to find 
policy-related facts, especially where the facts are not directly related 
to the case before them? Clearly, the agency's findings would be 
enhanced by preliminary findings by the judge responsible for 
providing the information necessary to make the finding-. -who is also 
in the position of applying the findings as well as the policy. Thus, 
administrative judges must have some authority to find policy-related 
facts. Especially, as this Article advocates, to the extent that 
administrative judges take part in the policymaking process. One 
obstacle facing policy analysis at the administrative judge level is the 
capacity of judges to find policy-related facts. Their expertise and 
experience might be insufficient to resolve the broad and technical 
facts related to a larger policy question. However, they are 
experienced factfinders and possess a certain type of experience and 
expertise. Thus, in the end, their initial findings will be valuable to an 
administrative review of the findings. 
In sum, administrative judges have a duty to assure an adequate 
Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51. 
186. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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record so that the administrative review authority can engage in 
policy analysis. Traditional record-building notions must be modified 
to create additional techniques to facilitate administrative judges 
carrying out this duty. Administrative law's openness to such 
modifications could form the legal and ethical foundation for 
enabling these powers. However, more than a responsibility to 
compile facts is necessary, some duty to engage in a preliminary 
finding of policy-related facts also seems appropriate. 
B. Potential Unfairness from Injecting Policy-Oriented 
Facts into an Individual Adjudication 
Assigning administrative judges the responsibility to find policy-
related facts raises a question of fairness of particular concern to the 
private litigant. For example, a hearing-level judge's concern for the 
policy-related record might compel the judge to find facts not directly 
relevant to adjudicating the particular dispute. The litigants, both the 
private litigant and the agency staff, are now engaged in a 
policymaking proceeding and acquire the responsibility for 
representing either the established policy or a need for adjustment. 
This is an unfair burden. 187 A judge must weigh the fairness of doing 
what is essentially "agency" business at the expense of the private 
party. Still, the hearing level is generally the fact-gathering and 
finding adjudicative stage, and administrative judges remain the 
vehicle likely to be most effective in assuring such support. 
Failure to confront the policy issues at the hearing level merely 
passes the fairness question to the administrative review authority. 
Suppose that authority, representing the agency, finds that it cannot 
resolve the larger policy dispute on the record before it. Unless it is 
satisfied to make general policy on inadequate facts, it is left with 
making the decision on its own experience and expertise, engaging in 
legislative fact-gathering itself, or returning the individual dispute for 
general policy-oriented facts. Any of these would force it to choose 
between inadequate supporting information and imposing an external 
burden on the litigants. 
187. Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 
HARV. L. REv. 393, 430 (1981) ("A policy decision made in response to a highly 
focused grievance can easily impinge on persons not directly involved."). 
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Where it cannot comfortably rely on the existing record and its 
own expertise, the administrative review authority might seek to 
improve the policymaking aspects of the adjudicative record. 
Traditionally, this body has more authority to add to the record than 
the courts. It does not violate due process to supplement the record 
after the hearing if the parties are notified of the intention to do so. 188 
Whatever limits exist might be less relevant to the addition of more 
broadly focused policy-oriented facts and comments. Nonetheless, 
this solution imposes a burden on the litigants, and superimposes a 
tangential inquiry on their individual dispute. 
Moreover, if the agency engages in policymaking at the 
administrative review level, other interested persons will want an 
opportunity to contribute facts and comments. The agency may feel 
competent to consider the additional interests injected into the 
adjudication, but those affected by the adjudicative-developed policy 
may feel excluded. 189 In addition, there is no guarantee that affected 
persons will even know of the new or adjusted policy, since-unlike 
rule changes-policy may be changed in adjudication without notice 
to all those potentially affected. The agency may be required to 
consider any new material evidence, but the duty to assure sufficient 
opportunity for comment should extend beyond that requirement. 190 
Adjudicative policy development then presents the dual fairness 
issues of the undue burden on the litigants to endure tangential 
inquiries and the possible exclusion of those affected by that policy. 
The focus of the individual dispute resolution is deflected to the 
detriment of the litigants and the adjudicative process, either at the 
hearing or appellate level, and is not well-suited to attracting a wide 
range of views. In short, supporting policymaking in the adjudicative 
188. McQuiddy v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 888 F.2d 1047, 
1048-49 (5th Cir. 1989). 
189. Those interests have the right to petition for rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 
553(e), but it is not likely to satisfy them. 
190. Peabody Coal Co. v. Ferguson, 140 F.3d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding 
that the opportunity to present new evidence to address changes in legal standards is 
required by due process); Williams v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that a party must be given an opportunity to challenge information obtained 
after the hearing); Wallace v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1989); Air 
Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. FERC, 650 F.2d 683, 687 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding the 
consideration of new evidence improper unless the parties have notice). 
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context might be unfair both to the individual litigants and to the 
affected public. Still, as we have seen, adjudication cannot ignore 
policy issues, and hence it must assure an adequate record for those 
issues. An agency must confront these fairness issues in developing 
policy in adjudication. In those cases in which the policy issue creates 
unfairness, the agency-perhaps at the recommendation of the 
judge-should consider rulemaking rather than case-by-case 
development of policy. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF COORDINATE ADJUDICATIVE MODELS 
So far, the discussion has assumed the traditional hierarchical 
adjudicative structure. In the traditional model, the adjudicative 
bureaucracy is internal and part of an organization in which the 
agency head is the final authority. However, not every administrative 
adjudicative system follows this model. In some systems, the 
adjudicative machinery is structurally separated from the 
"administrative" functions. In these systems, the adjudicative 
bureaucracy is coordinated rather than internal. Having investigated a 
generalized "hierarchical" model, we next look at the variations in 
those programs using a separate or "coordinate" structure. 
Coordinated adjudicative processes can be divided into two 
categories. One coordinate model, taking over state administrative 
adjudications, separates the administrative judges into an independent 
and central hearing office providing judges to a wide range of 
agencies. The second model, the "split function" model, delegates the 
adjudicative function to an agency separate from that responsible for 
program administration and hence program policy development. Each 
model raises somewhat different questions for policymaking in 
adjudication. 
A. A Centralized and Separate Office of Administrative Judges 
Half the states have centralized and independent hearing offices, 
known generally as a "central panel" or, better, a "central hearing 
agency." 191 This structure wreaks havoc with the traditional 
191. Flanagan identified 25 states and at least three major cities that have 
proposed federal adjudication for years. James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of 
the State Administrative Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State AU 
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administrative model in several ways, but here we need to focus only 
on its implications for policymaking. Given the fantastic increase in 
adjudication at the state level, the trend towards this model in the 
states, and the prospect-unrealized to date-that the federal 
government may move in that direction, the implications are 
important to this inquiry. In addition, the more visible division of 
labor revealed by these processes helps illuminate the issues 
discussed above. 
As argued above, a dynamic system of administrative policy 
development starts with the administrative judges and the hearing 
level. It follows that this developmental mechanism gives 
administrative judges some freedom to question established policy, 
and under certain circumstances to refuse to apply that policy to the 
individual case, even when its application is not ambiguous. It is 
equally necessary that the agency have the final authority regarding 
policy. That authority is necessary for uniformity and consistency. 
Individual dispute resolution cannot be allowed to make the program 
generally arbitrary. 
The independent hearing office structure upsets this balance. 
Because the program agencies lose control, the interests of 
consistency and equality require a strong commitment to rules and 
superior precedent. The panel judges, since they serve many agencies, 
are generalists and thus do not provide the expertise and experience 
inherent in the traditional scheme. 192 The administrative judges are 
largely denied the opportunity to participate in the evolution of 
policy. Judges who stray from prior decisions exercise a kind of 
capncwusness rather than participating in the evolution of 
administrative policy. This creates the danger of inconsistent policy 
application and removes the street-level experience from the policy 
Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1355, 1357 (2002); 
see also Scalia, supra note 42, at 79 ("The problem of improper influence would 
also be solved by implementing proposals for establishment of a unified AU corps, 
headed by an independent administrator."). For several reasons, the unified panel 
has not been adopted in the federal system. VERKUll- ET AL., supra note 40, at 171-
74. 
192. Edward Tomlinson, The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act: Forty 
Years Old in 1997, 56 MD. L. REv. 196, 253 (1997) ("The substitution of generalist 
central office ALJs for specialist agency hearing examiners is nevertheless likely to 
reduce the role of expertise."). 
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process. 
In addition, the panel structure replaces a specialized, program-
sensitive judicial community with an isolated, generalist 
administrative judiciary. In a sense, this independent office suggests a 
community more like the traditional judiciary. While this 
accomplishes the goal of structural independence, it generates a 
different, but not necessarily beneficial, group dynamic. 193 Several 
studies, discussed above, show that judges work within the ethos of 
their judicial community. The independent hearing office will affect 
policy development and application. In short, this independence has a 
pnce. 
Some of the disadvantages may be offset by courts reviewing the 
result of the independent hearing office judge's decision in which the 
agency has rejected the judge's policy conclusions. If the court limits 
itself to reviewing the agency's policy conclusions and ignoring those 
of the administrative judge, then it will put the agency back in charge 
of its policy. However, if the court weighs the two policy conclusions 
and chooses the one it prefers, it arrogates power to itself as well as 
destroys the agency's control over its policy. Neither is optimal for 
the operation of an administrative program, for the reasons given 
above. 
The division also creates the specter of policymaking through 
litigation strategy. If the policy is at issue, it means that the policy did 
not exist or is unclear at the time of the administrative adjudication. 
The agency must fill the gap through its litigation position at the 
administrative hearing, uninformed by an opportunity to review the 
administrative judge's efforts. The agency, even in adjudication, 
should not be defining policy as an advocate. Moreover, much of the 
decision will be made by the litigation staff, further compromising 
193. The empirical study by Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Witrich of errors caused 
by cognitive illusions, discussed above, supports the value of specialization on the 
bench. Guthrie et al., supra note 131, at 825 ("[J]udicial decision making might 
also benefit from specialization on the bench."). Judge Wood argues that 
specialization makes judging more complex and difficult to understand. Diane P. 
Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 1755, 1767 
(1997). On specialization generally, see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the 
Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. 
L. REv. 1 (1995); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. 
REv. 377. 
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the objectivity of the policy analysis. On balance, it is better to hold 
the separate adjudicative agency to the agency's litigation position, 
but even if this occurs, policymaking has been robbed of the 
interaction between the administrative judge and the agency on the 
policy issue. Hence, Flanagan observed that the "more subtle effect of 
AU independence . . . is the loss of agency experience in the 
application of the law and regulations." 194 
Generally, the central office system forces agencies to make most 
policy moves by rules. Many see this as a good thing; commentators 
over the years, starting with Justice Jackson in Chenery II, would 
force agencies in this direction. 195 Indeed, the administrative law of 
some states requires rulemaking. 196 Added to that is the growing 
trend in the states to force agencies to make rules only through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, and hence assure general 
participation in the policymaking. An unfortunate consequence is that 
the agency is doubly inhibited in the development of policy. First, it 
cannot use the adjudication to inform itself on the application and 
change of circumstances. Second, it cannot use guidance documents 
to disclose any new policy thinking or cautiously evolve policy 
without making an ultimate final commitment and engaging in full-
blown rulemaking. 
The panel system presents an ambiguity as to the effect of rules 
on the adjudication. The administrative judges' position as a team of 
generalist judges, separated into an adjudicating agency, casts them 
more as an administrative court. 197 If panel judges are seen as 
separate courts then it might follow that they are bound only by 
legislative rules-rules made pursuant to delegated authority. In the 
internalized hierarchical model, the agency's duty is to obey its own 
rules. While some freedom in application by the judges is suggested 
above, such policy pronouncements nonetheless express the 
authoritative view of the agency and hence must be given 
194. Flanagan, supra note 191, at 1406. 
195. E.g., Gifford, supra note 41, at 982. 
196. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
I 97. William Swent, South Carolina's AU: Central Panel, Administrative 
Court, or a Little of Both?, 48 S.C. L. REv. 1, 6 (1996) ("Opponents of reform 
parse the phrase 'creeping judicialization' and worry about the erosion of agency 
policy and clout."). 
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considerable force at the hearing level. When the judges are not 
structurally part of the agency, a fundamental question arises as to 
whether they are governed by the second principle at all. In that case, 
they might be empowered to give all rules without the "force of law" 
no more than Skidmore "power to persuade" deference. 
Thus the panel system encourages administrative judges to 
engage in independent policymaking in several ways. But, where do 
panel judges get the policy they use in their own policy analysis? Is it 
too glib to say that they have independent authority to interpret the 
statute and merely go directly to the statutory language? After all, 
agency policy pronouncements are not actual "interpretations" but 
rather a product of the responsibility to carry forward the legislative 
policy and to make policy. 198 When panel judges circumvent the 
agency's policymaking and engage in their own policy development, 
even in the guise of statutory interpretation, they short-circuit the 
intended operation of the administrative process and rob it of one of 
its major advantages. 
More importantly, when judges circumvent agency policymaking, 
they inject their own policy biases into the system and arrogate 
policymaking power. This Article has previously discussed legitimate 
sources of policy analysis upon which administrative judges may rely. 
Also suggested is the idea that administrative judges acting in a 
hierarchical process perform an important function by questioning 
existing policy from their applied perspective or initiating change. In 
contrast, judges outside the agency, whose policy judgments have 
some finality, create potential InJUStice and poor program 
administration. If they are to engage in policy forays, then it is 
extremely important that their efforts are reviewed by the agency in 
order to protect the agency's delegated policymaking function and 
guard against improperly motivated policy judgments. The panels 
system unfortunately weakens agency review as a practical matter. 
In addition, Flanagan observed that along with the panels, a 
second trend somewhat related to the panel movement has emerged 
in which state administrative judges issue decisions that are largely 
beyond the reach of the agencies. "This may be done directly, by 
eliminating agency review on most issues decided by an ALJ, or 
indirectly, by making it difficult or impossible for the agency to 
198. Chenery II, supra note 13, at 194. 
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modify the AUs [sic] decision." 199 In essence, this "final order" 
regime shifts policy enforcement-and to some extent evolution-to 
the courts. This shift deprives the administrative adjudication of 
much of its value. First, the agency, not the courts, is intended and 
constructed to make policy. Second, the courts become a competing 
policymaking authority, resulting in bifurcated and confused policy 
development. 
It is not clear that this shift to judicial policymaking makes the 
policy less political. In fact, the shift may be a reaction to 
uncontrollable objectivity, centralized decisionmaking, or a certain 
brand of politics-not politics itself.200 Most state judges are elected 
and, contrary to commentary and the ABA, the electorate is more 
insistent than ever on that system of selecting judges.201 While the 
agencies themselves are political, their decisions are usually the result 
of the kind of objective, expert judgments they were created to 
provide.202 This is reinforced by the courts under some limiting 
199. Flanagan, supra note 191, at 1359. 
200. See Hardwicke, supra note 90, at 423 ("[L]egislatures instinctively 
distrust an expanding, independent judiciary."). 
201. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO ACTION: STATEMENT OF 
THE NATIONAL SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION 7 (2002), at 
http://www .ncsconline.org/D _Research/CallToActionCommentary .pdf (2002) 
("Eighty-seven percent of state appellate and trial judges are selected through direct 
or retention elections."). The report of the ABA's Commission on the 21st Century 
Judiciary states: 
The Commission opposes the use of judicial elections as a 
means of initial selection and reselection .... The Commission 
acknowledges, though, that support for judicial elections remains 
entrenched in many states. With that in mind, the Commission 
offers a series of alternative judicial selection recommendations 
aimed at ameliorating some of the deleterious effects of elections 
on the enduring principles of a good judicial system. 
/d. This is not the official position of the ABA, and traditionally the ABA has been 
even less accepting of elected judges. American Bar Association Commission on 
the 21st Century Judiciary Principles and Conclusions, at 
http://www .abanet.org!leadership/2003/joumal/1 03. pdf (Aug. 2003 ). 
202. An empirical study in North Carolina produced results that suggest 
objective judgments. Daye, supra note 44. The panel judges agreed with the agency 
in 76% of the cases. /d. at 1615. Agency review reversed ALJ decisions in favor of 
the agency in a significant number of cases, although the number of these reversals 
was quite disproportionate to reversal of pro-petitioner cases. Id. at 1617. Still, the 
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review standard or instruction, hence the courts and the agency check 
each other. Making the courts the sole arbiter of administrative policy 
changes the politics in both kind and degree. 
Moreover, only a few decisions from panel judges are subject to 
judicial challenge, thus the administrative judge's decision is the final 
word. Asimow observed: 
So the real result is the AU makes the policy. And 
when an AU, for example, makes a big holding in 
favor of the private party, which is followed as 
precedent by other AUs, a regulatory or beneficiary 
program can be halted in its tracks until the agency 
secures a legislative change. 203 
For these reasons, there is much to be said for Texas's attempt to 
allocate functions so that the agency retains authority over policy. 
Thus, the Texas statute authorized the agency to reverse AU 
decisions only on questions of "policy."204 The absence of a workable 
definition of policy led it to shift to specific grounds upon which the 
agency may be reversed. Given the values discussed here, it might be 
better to give the agency some freedom to justify their actions on the 
basis of protecting administrative policy. Indeed, this is reminiscent 
of Chenery II in which the U.S. Supreme Court gave the agency the 
opportunity to demonstrate that it engaged in its policy development 
function.Z05 A court should be able to measure the performance of 
agency policymaking responsibility without becoming a second 
policymaker. 
What is really needed is a thoughtful effort to recapitulate in the 
panel system the policy exchange and allocation of authority inherent 
in a hierarchical system. Such a system means that the agency must 
have some authority to reverse the judges on policy grounds. On the 
other hand, it means that judges should be encouraged to experiment 
with policy adjustments so long as the agency can accept or reject 
agency review produced only a 9.5% increase in agency-favorable decisions. /d. at 
1619. Flanagan concluded from the whole body of data "that agency review 
produces results that are supported by the law and the facts." 
203. Michael Asimow, correspondence (on file with the author). 
204. Flanagan, supra note 191, at 1371. 
205. See Chenery II, supra note 13, at 194. 
Spring 2005 Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary 113 
their efforts. Central office systems should also develop formal 
vehicles for the judges to add their experience in applying policy to 
the information available to the agency. Panel judges, for example, 
could have the opportunity to identify cases which show a need for 
adjustment or new policy. Indeed, an agency may ask the hearing 
office for periodic reports on potential policy initiatives and changes. 
B. Split-Function Models 
A few administrative schemes, known as "split-function" or 
"split-enforcement" models, separate the adjudicative function and 
the enforcement and policy function into two separate agencies. 206 
One agency makes policy through rulemaking and enforcement 
strategy while a separate agency adjudicates violations of that 
policy.207 While presenting divided policymaking results in dangers 
similar to the panel systems, these are structurally different in two 
ways. First, split-function systems are confined to one program, while 
the panels serve a range of programs. Second, and more important for 
our purposes, the adjudicative hierarchy is self-contained; both 
hearings and review are conducted within the separate adjudicating 
agency.208 
At one point, this scheme had a number of advocates. Gifford 
argued: "When these [administrative] tasks raise numerous policy 
issues [in adjudication] . . . then the alternative [split-function] 
structure is optimal."209 Experience has not been as kind. Shapiro and 
McGarity concluded: "[The Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission] is the creature of a failed experiment with the split-
enforcement model."210 Strauss had a similar negative reaction to the 
206. See Gifford, supra note 41, at 1000-01. 
207. The most visible such programs are in the federal system. However, many 
states also have programs that fit the basic split-function model. Most pervasive of 
these is workers compensation, which has an agency to adjudicate employee injury 
and health complaints. See id. (explaining the history of the movement toward split-
function systems). 
208. See George R. Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some 
Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 315,349 
(1987). 
209. Gifford, supra note 41, at 971. 
210. Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: 
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actual results of the split-function model in mining. 211 Because of 
these studies, the split-function model has lost its momentum. 
Nonetheless, Fallon argues for the split-function model in air safety 
even though he recognizes the loss of some of the policy evolution 
advantages.212 Is there anything different about air safety, when 
compared to mine safety and employee safety, which changes the 
calculus? The different conclusions might result from a different 
balance in the perceived advantages. The gains from agency 
participation in the adjudicative process for Fallon do not outweigh 
the gains from clear separation. Administrative law commentators 
such as Shapiro, McGarity, and Strauss, find more formidable 
benefits from agency control over policy questions in adjudication. 
The split-function model also offends administrative law thinking 
by eliminating agency discretion to choose between policy 
development through rulemaking and adjudication. Tradition, 
affirmed by Wyman-Gordon among others, allows the agency to 
decide which avenue to pursue.213 Administrative law has established 
that this discretion has significant advantages, several of which are 
rehearsed above. Strauss argues that by eliminating the ability to 
choose among policymaking methods, the split-function model 
prevents the agency from finding the best process for developing 
policy.214 
The Supreme Court defused concern over the aspect of split-
function schemes that most troubled administrative law 
commentators. Many worried that the courts would arrogate power in 
arbitrating disputes between the agency and the adjudicative body. In 
Martin v. OSHRC,215 the Supreme Court found that Congress 
intended for the Secretary of Labor's policy judgments to control 
over those of the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. I, 62 (1989). 
211. Peter L. Strauss, Rules, Adjudication, and Other Sources of Law in an 
Executive Department: Reflections on the Interior Department's Administration of 
the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1231 (1974). 
212. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Enforcing Aviation Safety Regulations: The Case 
for a Split-Enforcement Model of Agency Adjudication, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 389, 392-93 
(1991). 
213. See supra note 19. 
214. Strauss, supra note 208, at 1258-59. 
215. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144 
(1991). 
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Commission (OSHRC).216 It concluded that "Congress did not intend 
to sever the power authoritatively to interpret OSH Act regulations 
from the Secretary's power to promulgate and enforce them."217 The 
agency's interpretations are dominant even if offered in the context of 
an administrative adjudication before the adjudicating body: "Under 
these circumstances, the Secretary's litigating position before the 
Commission is as much an exercise of delegated lawmaking powers 
as is the Secretary's promulgation of a workplace health and safety 
standard."218 Thus, reviewing courts as well as the adjudicating 
agency may not exercise independent policy judgment. 
Still, because the administrative review authority is not under the 
control of the agency, the system loses the policymaking contribution 
inherent in the appellate process. The bifurcation of responsibility 
prevents the agency from engaging in the traditional interstitial 
policymaking and totally excludes adjudicators from contributing to 
policymaking. Taking the adjudicators out of the policy development 
process is even more undesirable here than with respect to the panel 
systems. The split-function adjudicators are specialists, whereas the 
hearing judges in the panel structure are more like generalist judges 
who claim no special expertise in the subject matter. Thus, split-
function adjudicators have potentially more to offer. This means that 
the system loses more by taking them out of the policymaking 
function. Also, they are most likely more frustrated than panel judges 
at their inability to participate, perhaps leading them to seek means 
with which to inject their own policy judgments. Mintz concluded 
that, while the Supreme Court has clearly instructed the OSHRC that 
policy questions are to be left to the Labor Department, "The Review 
Commission . . . has not [done so]; we may then suggest that an 
adjudicatory agency does not easily reconcile itself to a non-policy 
role as would a prosecutory official, such as the General Counsel."219 
216./d. at 154-55. 
217. !d. at 157-58; see also Allegheny Teledyne, Inc. v. United States, 316 
F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (agreeing with the trial court that "only the 
interpretation of the agency that promulgated the regulation matters"). 
218. Martin, 499 U.S. at 157. 
219. Benjamin W. Mintz, Administrative Separation of Functions: OSHA and 
the NLRB, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 877, 917 (1998) (comparing the operation of 
OSHA's split-function process with the separation of prosecutorial and 
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In short, the split-function model presents disadvantages from all 
perspectives of the policymaking task. 
CONCLUSION 
The administrative process augments two seemingly distinct 
governmental functions: resolving individual disputes and developing 
government policy. Agencies perform these functions under a 
mandate from the legislature and within the confines of that mandate. 
Most agencies are afforded substantial policymaking authority within 
their delegated responsibility. Indeed, the need for policy 
development beyond the legislative mandate is usually the reason for 
choosing an administrative approach over other alternatives for 
confronting a societal problem. Often this function is performed by a 
process focused on policymaking, usually some form of 
"rulemaking." In contrast, administrative adjudications determine 
individual rights and duties created through an administrative 
program. However, agency adjudicators must work with agency 
policy, hence even individual dispute resolution interacts with the 
policymaking function. This interaction in turn contributes to the 
body of administrative policy or agency law. The operation of 
administrative policy development within the administrative 
adjudicative machinery has been the focus of this Article. 
In looking at the internal performance of policymaking in 
adjudication, we see a division of functions among the various 
adjudicative officials. Like the conventional judiciary, administrative 
judiciaries have hierarchies of decisionmakers, and administrative 
adjudicative officials at each level have different roles within the 
adjudicative machinery. Each actor contributes differently to the 
interpretation of statutes, rules, and other adjudicative decisions, to 
factfinding, and to the policy analysis necessary to the resolution of 
the individual disputes. This Article focused on the part played by 
hearing-level officials, the administrative judges, and the context in 
which they perform. The administrative judges launch the policy 
analysis as both record builders and initial decisionmakers. All other 
participants in the adjudicative process, including the courts, work 
from this initial policy analysis. However, each participant confronts 
policymaking functions in the NLRB). 
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its own policymaking demands. Thus, each system must find its own 
balance between the responsibility to do individual justice in 
adjudications and the need to evolve and control policy. This Article 
has attempted to provide the foundation and framework for doing so. 
